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The ideological divide in American politics is at an historic high. Ranking con-
gressional legislators on a  liberal-conservative scale, based either on their  roll-call 
votes (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2016) or the political orientation of their 
campaign contributors (Bonica 2013), reveals that the gap between Democrats and 
Republicans has been widening since the late 1970s.1 A sizable rightward shift 
among the GOP and a modest leftward shift among Democrats has left few centrists 
in either party. The twenty-first century has also seen greater polarization in the pol-
icy preferences and media viewing habits of the American public. In the 1990s and 
early 2000s, roughly one-half of respondents took moderate positions on prominent 
political issues; by the late 2000s the centrist share had shrunk to under 40 percent, 
as individuals adopted more strident views on the left or right (Pew Research Center 
2014a; Gentzkow 2016). These trends are also reflected in, and amplified by, popu-
lar media (DellaVigna and Kaplan 2007; Levendusky 2013; Martin and Yurukoglu 
2017).
This paper examines whether the exposure of local labor markets to increased 
foreign competition from China has contributed to rising political polarization in 
the United States since 2000. The appeal of studying the China shock is the abun-
dant evidence linking foreign competition to a large and persistent decline in US 
manufacturing jobs. Industries more exposed to trade with China have seen higher 
exit of plants (Bernard, Jensen, and Schott 2006), larger contractions in employment 
(Pierce and Schott 2016; Acemoglu et al. 2016), and lower incomes for affected 
workers (Autor et al. 2014; Galle, Rodríguez-Clare, and Yi 2017; Caliendo, Dvorkin, 
and Parro 2019; Autor, Dorn, and Hanson 2019). The local labor markets that are 
home to  more-exposed industries have endured greater job loss and larger increases 
in unemployment,  nonparticipation in the labor force, uptake of government trans-
fers (Autor, Dorn, and Hanson 2013a, 2019), and declines in tax revenues and hous-
ing prices (Feler and Senses 2015). The steepest increase in US imports occurred 
just after China’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001: China’s share 
of world manufacturing exports surged from 4.8 percent in 2000 to 15.1 percent 
in 2010. This export boom was driven by  reform-induced productivity growth in 
Chinese manufacturing (Naughton 2007; Brandt et al. 2017), where China’s reform 
push and the productivity gains associated with it appeared to have largely abated 
by the late 2000s (Brandt, Wang, and Zhang 2017).2 The concentrated impact of the 
China shock on specific industries and regions makes the economic consequences of 
trade acutely recognizable and therefore politically salient (Margalit 2011; Di Tella 
and Rodrik 2019).
While US political polarization did not originate with the China trade shock, 
the political divisions have widened amid the recent expansion of trade. Moderate 
Democrats have become increasingly rare in Congress, while Tea Party and 
 like-minded conservatives have risen to prominence in the GOP (Madestam et al. 
1 In the 1990s and especially the 2000s, greater polarization is also evident in the content of political speech used 
by Democratic and Republican legislators (Gentzkow, Shapiro, and Taddy 2019).
2 Over 2000 to 2010, China’s annual growth rate in manufacturing exports was 11.5 percentage points (p.p.) 
faster than the world as a whole; over 2010 to 2016, its growth advantage was just 2.8 p.p. Although China’s 
manufacturing exports continued to grow after 2010, the transitional growth associated with China’s  post-Mao 
 market-oriented reforms, on which we base our identification strategy, was largely exhausted by the end of that 
decade (Naughton 2018; Lardy 2019).
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2013). The surprise election of Donald J. Trump to the presidency in 2016 has fur-
ther heightened the partisan divide and injected ethnic nationalism into Republican 
policy positions. Among voters, ideological cleavages by race and education have 
also widened, as seen most notably in a realignment of  less-educated Whites with the 
GOP (Pew Research Center 2017).3 The causal linkages between economic shocks 
and sustained increases in partisanship remain poorly understood, however. Mian, 
Sufi, and Trebbi (2014) finds that while congressional voting patterns become more 
polarized following financial crises, these movements are temporary.4 Although 
the widening ideological divide in Congress tracks rising US income inequality 
(McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2016; Voorheis, McCarty, and Shor 2016), the coin-
cidence of these two phenomena does not reveal which underlying shocks inten-
sify partisanship.5 The concentrated and  well-delineated economic geography of 
the China trade shock allows us to explore the linkages between economics shocks 
and political outcomes that are otherwise challenging to evaluate in a  time-series or 
 cross-country analysis.
In applying a local labor market lens to US electoral politics, our analysis con-
fronts two empirical challenges. One is that local labor markets, which we take to 
be commuting zones (CZs), do not map cleanly to congressional districts. Whereas 
CZs aggregate contiguous counties, gerrymandering often creates districts that span 
parts of several commuting zones. We resolve this issue by dividing the United 
States into  county-by-congressional-district cells, attaching each cell to its corre-
sponding CZ, and weighting each cell by its share of its district’s  voting-age pop-
ulation. To measure regional trade exposure, we use the change in industry import 
penetration from China, weighting each industry by its initial share of CZ employ-
ment. We isolate the component of growth in US imports from China that is driven 
by  export-supply growth in China, rather than US  product-demand shocks, follow-
ing the identification strategy in Autor et al. (2014) and Acemoglu et al. (2016).
The discontinuous changes in voter composition and frequent turnover of incum-
bent representatives caused by the redrawing of US congressional districts after 
each decennial census present a second empirical challenge. We surmount this issue 
by studying changes in the ideology of legislators first over the 2002 to 2010 period, 
during which most district boundaries are fixed and the mapping of districts to CZs 
is stable, and then over the 2002 to 2016 period, which requires us to account for 
 redistricting-induced changes in the mapping of districts to CZs. When studying the 
extended  2002–2016 period, we exclude electoral outcomes across the intermediate 
 2010–2012 redistricting seam, except for the small number of districts that did not 
change boundaries.
3 For analysis of the rise of  right-wing populism in  high-income countries, see Inglehart and Norris (2016); 
Algan et al. (2017); Gidron and Hall (2017); Guiso, Herrera, and Morelli (2017); Dehdari (2018); and Dal Bó 
et al. (2019). For related work on populism, see Karakas and Mitra (2017); Rodrik (2017); and Pastor and Veronesi 
(2018).
4 For related analysis of Europe, see Funke, Schularick, and Trebesch (2016).
5 The rise in political polarization appears causally unrelated to the structure of primary elections, rule changes 
in Congress, gerrymandering, or immigration (Gelman 2009; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2009, 2016; Barber 
and McCarty 2015). Other factors related to polarization include intensified media partisanship (DellaVigna and 
Kaplan 2007; Levendusky 2013; Prior 2013) and stronger ideological sorting of voters by party (Levendusky 2009). 
See Canen, Kendall, and Trebbi (2018) on the contribution of the practices and structures of the major political 
parties to polarization.
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We begin the analysis by evaluating how trade shocks affect political expression. 
We use TV ratings data from Nielsen Media to examine the news viewing habits of 
households, and we use the Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections 
(DIME: Bonica 2013, 2014, 2018) to examine the ideological leanings of campaign 
donors. Over 2004 to 2016, regions more exposed to import competition from 
China shifted consumption of TV news to the  right-leaning Fox News Channel. 
Simultaneously, they increasingly drew campaign contributions from  left-wing and 
 right-wing donors but not from moderates. These patterns suggest that exposure to 
import shocks moved political sentiment away from the ideological center. A con-
sistent finding woven among the many threads of evidence we examine is that the 
rightward shifts in ideological affiliation and voting patterns are more concentrated 
among or driven by  non-Hispanic Whites, with small, zero, or countervailing effects 
evident among Hispanics and  non-Whites.
We next examine the impact of exposure to trade shocks on the party and ideo-
logical composition of elected congressional legislators.6 Although shocks increase 
campaign contributions from both liberal and conservative donors, across all dis-
tricts the net beneficiaries in terms of electoral results are Republican candidates, 
and the most conservative candidates in particular. Districts exposed to larger 
increases in import competition became significantly more likely to elect a GOP 
legislator in each election from 2010 to 2016, while conservative rather than moder-
ate Republicans absorbed these electoral gains. This occurs despite the fact that the 
net impact of the China shock on the Republican vote share in Congressional elec-
tions is small, and in some years even negative, as is the case in a  county-level vote 
share analysis by Che et al. (2016). We find that the GOP was especially success-
ful in increasing its vote share in competitive districts, while the Democratic party 
gained vote shares but not congressional seats in  noncompetitive districts.7 Hence, 
although the ideological composition of political donations appears to polarize in 
 trade-exposed districts, the net electoral benefits accrue to the GOP.
Motivated by the diverging political views of  non-Hispanic Whites relative to 
 non-Whites and Hispanics, documented in Pew polling data used by our analysis, 
we further explore whether these outcomes appear to differ systematically with the 
racial and ethnic composition of voting districts. With the caveat that further splits 
of the data increase the risk of false positives, we observe that rising trade expo-
sure simultaneously predicts a rise in the odds that majority White  non-Hispanic 
areas elect GOP conservatives and the odds that majority  non-White areas elect 
liberal Democrats. Of course, majority White  non-Hispanic districts vastly outnum-
ber  majority-minority districts. In both sets of districts, candidates advantaged by 
adverse trade shocks appear to pull support from moderate Democrats. Consequently, 
it is the GOP that gains in net from trade shocks.
6 A large literature, beginning with Fair (1978), finds that economic downturns hurt sitting politicians. Margalit 
(2011) and Jensen, Quinn, and Weymouth (2017) show that voters also punish incumbents for the adverse effects 
of import competition.
7 Whereas it is challenging to interpret the electoral consequences of  county-level congressional vote shares, 
which are aggregated across gerrymandered congressional districts, one can readily study vote shares of pres-
idential elections, given that all counties choose among the same set of candidates. In Section V, we show that 
over the 2000 to 2016 period, more  trade-exposed counties saw larger gains in vote shares for the GOP presi-
dential candidate.
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Why does greater trade exposure appear to engender stronger support for more 
ideological extreme candidates? One canonical explanation is resource competition. 
Because adverse trade shocks increase local uptake of government transfers (Autor, 
Dorn, and Hanson 2013a) and reduce local tax revenues (Feler and Senses 2015), 
they are likely to intensify competition for government funds. To the extent that 
White voters disadvantaged by economic changes see GOP conservatives as favor-
ing their interests over those of other groups, while disadvantaged minority voters 
see liberal Democrats as their champions, we would expect the political response 
to a common shock to vary by race (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999; Alesina and 
La Ferrara 2005; Parker and Barreto 2014; Kuziemko and Washington 2018), an 
implication that our analysis confirms across multiple outcome measures.
A more encompassing explanation for why trade protectionism and  identity-based 
politics  co-occur in districts facing rising trade exposure is found in the behavioral 
 general equilibrium frameworks of Grossman and Helpman (2018) and Gennaioli 
and Tabellini (2019). Introducing  social-identity theory into an otherwise stan-
dard trade model, Grossman and Helpman (2018) shows how adverse economic 
shocks, due to, e.g., globalization, may precipitate both a psychological response 
that strengthens one’s identification with a particular social group (e.g., the White 
working class) and a material interest in stronger trade protection. Intensified for-
eign competition (or other adverse shocks) may thus increase the political salience 
of racial and ethnic identities among voters, along with support for nationalist eco-
nomic policies.
Extending this reasoning outside the (exclusive) realm of trade policy, Gennaioli 
and Tabellini (2019) studies the interplay between economic and social policy in a 
setting where low- and  high-income voters may shift allegiances between either a 
 class-based identity, where taxation and redistribution are salient, or a  culture-based 
identity, where nationalist and tribal sentiments are foregrounded. Adverse eco-
nomic shocks in this setting can heighten cultural identity at the expense of class 
identity, or  vice versa, with potentially unconventional effects on policy. Gennaioli 
and Tabellini (2019) illustrates one scenario where, as globalization accelerates, the 
locus of group identity switches from class conflict to nationalist versus cosmopol-
itan (cultural) conflict. As this occurs, the losers from globalization become more 
protectionist and reduce their demands for redistribution.
Because  right-wing populist movements tend to arise during times of economic 
hardship (Hutchings and Valentino 2004; Inglehart and Norris 2016; Algan et al. 
2017), a related explanation for the  co-occurrence of heightened animus toward 
both foreign trading partners and  foreign-born individuals stems from political 
opportunism. Glaeser, Ponzetto, and Shapiro (2005) formalizes this intuition in a 
model where politicians deploy strategic extremism (e.g., inflaming wedge issues) 
to amplify cultural identification and thereby raise turnout among core supporters. 
We suspect that the  identity-based and  opportunism-based motivations are strategic 
complements, with adverse shocks triggering  group-identity shifts, and politicians 
exploiting these shifts for electoral gain.
Although we cannot definitively separate  resource-based versus  identity-based 
explanations for the political outcomes we observe, both the  Gennaioli-Tabellini 
and  Grossman-Helpman frameworks make a prediction that is not directly addressed 
by  resource-based approaches, which is that trade shocks increase support for 
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 protectionism, an implication strongly confirmed by Feigenbaum and Hall (2015).8 
One alternative explanation for our primary findings that we can reject is that they 
are merely a byproduct of a secular trend favoring conservatives. That trade shocks 
appear to catalyze support for  more-extreme actors in both parties, at the expense 
of moderates, indicates that we are not simply capturing a general rightward shift in 
US politics.
Given that the GOP has endorsed the principle of free trade since the 1950s 
(Irwin 2017), it may appear paradoxical that trade shocks both increase support for 
protectionism and advantage Republican candidates. One resolution is found in the 
Feigenbaum and Hall (2015) result that support for protectionism is pervasive in 
 trade-exposed districts, irrespective of party. They estimate that import competition 
raises support for protectionist trade bills by an equal extent in safe Democratic and 
safe Republican districts, and about twice as much in competitive districts.9
The United States is not alone of course in seeing economic adversity strengthen 
the electoral prospects of  right-wing politicians. During the Great Depression, 
 far-right movements had greater success in European countries that had more pro-
longed downturns (de Bromhead, Eichengreen, and O’Rourke 2013). Today, French 
and German regions more exposed to trade with  low-wage countries have seen larger 
increases in vote shares for the far right (Dippel et  al. 2017; Malgouyres 2017), 
British regions more exposed to trade with China voted more strongly in favor of 
Brexit (Colantone and Stanig 2018a), and EU regions more exposed to the Great 
Recession have seen a greater rise in voting for  anti-establishment,  euro-skeptic 
parties (Algan et al. 2017; Dehdari 2018; Dal Bó et al. 2019).10
Our work differs from existing literature by documenting an ideological realign-
ment that manifests itself in a wide range of outcomes beyond vote shares, and 
includes patterns of polarization rather than a uniform shift in ideology. The broad 
body of evidence that we evaluate suggests that trade shocks favored conservative 
views and politicians overall, where these gains came at the expense of centrist rather 
than  left-wing forces, and reflected an ideological repositioning of  majority-White 
versus  majority-non-White regions. While the evidence we find across multiple 
domains supports the inference that the China trade shock was a causal contrib-
utor to the  post-2000 ideological realignment, it would be premature to view this 
evidence as dispositive. Further work and additional years of outcome data will be 
8 In related work, Kleinberg and Fordham (2013) and Kuk, Seligsohn, and Zhang (2015) find that legislators 
from districts harder hit by the China trade shock are more likely to support  foreign-policy legislation that rebukes 
China. For other work on how congressional representatives vote on trade legislation, see Bailey and Brady (1998), 
Baldwin and Magee (2000), Hiscox (2002), and Milner and Tingley (2011). On  labor-market shocks and support 
for protectionism, see Colantone and Stanig (2018b) on Europe and Di Tella and Rodrik (2019) on the United 
States.
9 In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the GOP was protectionist, given its bases of support in 
 manufacturing-oriented states in the Midwest and Northeast (Irwin 2017). Suspicion of trade agreements on 
the right is not novel in the  postwar era. Members of the Republican Liberty Caucus and the House Freedom 
Caucus, two groups of  right-wing GOP legislators in the House, opposed the  Trans-Pacific Partnership, a recent 
major trade deal, and are frequent critics of the WTO. Several decades earlier, the conservative stalwart Senator 
Barry Goldwater opposed the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, which enabled the president to negotiate tariff reduc-
tions in the Kennedy Round of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs. In contemporary public opinion 
polls, GOP voters are wary of trade accords. A recent survey of the Pew Research Center (2016) indicates that 
53 percent of voters who identify or lean Republican, as compared to 34 percent of voters who identify or lean 
Democrat, see  free-trade agreements as a “bad thing for the US.”
10 Political scientists suggest that ideology of the GOP may be in flux, shifting from  laissez faire policy and 
limited government toward nationalism and ethnic identity (Inglehart and Norris 2016; Mann and Ornstein 2016).
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required to ascertain whether these shifts to the extremes persist and cohere in the 
long run, or whether they prove transitory and perhaps incidental.
In Section  I, we describe our data on political beliefs, media viewership, and 
campaign contributions, and next summarize our data on local labor markets, 
how we match these markets to congressional districts, and how we account for 
congressional redistricting in Section  II. We present our empirical results on the 
impacts of trade shocks on political expression in Section III, on legislator ideology 
in Section IV, and on presidential voting in Section V. Section VI concludes.
I. National Trends in Political Expression and Partisanship
We begin by considering how political expression in the United States has changed 
over time. To account for myriad forms of political engagement, we study three dis-
parate types of expression. Surveys of public opinion from the Pew Research Center 
provide direct information on the political beliefs of potential voters; Nielsen data 
on the ratings of cable news networks capture the relative standing of  right-leaning 
Fox News and more  left-leaning MSNBC and CNN; and DIME measures of cam-
paign contributions indicate how donor support for candidates has shifted along the 
ideological spectrum. These data reveal the demand side for ideology, which we will 
later use to examine which viewpoints and sentiments have been most emboldened 
by adverse trade shocks.
A. Changes in Voter Beliefs on Political Issues
We use data from the Pew Research Center to measure changes in voter ideology 
over time (Pew Research Center 2014b, 2015).11 Pew periodically asks US adult 
survey participants a consistent set of questions about their political beliefs. In each 
of ten questions, participants choose which of two opposing statements on a topic, 
one  left-leaning, one  right-leaning, best reflects their opinion. Online Appendix 
Table S1 enumerates these questions.12 By coding agreement with  left-leaning and 
 right-leaning statements as −1 and +1, respectively, Pew constructs a measure of 
the left–right distribution of political beliefs on the  [− 10, +10] interval, which we 
refer to as the Pew ideology score. We use data on political beliefs, rather than 
party identification, because beliefs directly reflect ideology whereas party attach-
ment may not (Abramowitz and Webster 2016).13 The data show both a rightward 
shift and a strong polarization in participant political beliefs over the 2000s. In 
panel A of Table 1, which pools all respondents, the mean ideology score among 
11 Other surveys of political beliefs, including the American National Election Studies, the General Social Survey, 
and the Cooperative Congressional Election Survey, do not suit our purposes due to timing or limited sample size.
12 Other work that uses Pew data to study polarization includes Gentzkow, Shapiro, and Taddy (2019), while 
Gentzkow (2016) discusses alternative measures of political polarization used in the literature. Survey data that 
measure respondents’ views of the other party rather than their views on specific issues indicate a sharp rise in 
polarization in the  mid-1990s, suggesting an increase in party salience. Data that track polarization of specific 
issue positions, however, do not detect a rise of polarization until the  mid-2000s (Gentzkow 2016).
13 We obtained from Pew unpublished geocoded microdata for its surveys in 2004, 2011, 2014, and 2015, 
yielding a pooled sample of 20,785 observations. We retain all survey respondents who reside in the 48 mainland 
states, and drop the 0.6 percent of observations that have incomplete demographic information. Microdata prior to 
2004 were unavailable.
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all  respondents increased from −0.91 to −0.61 from 2004 to 2015, corresponding 
to one more survey item with a  right-leaning answer for every seven respondents.14 
The fraction of participants whose ideology was centrist (Pew score of −2 to 2) fell 
from 48.7 percent in 2004 to 42.2 percent in 2011 and declined further to 37.6 per-
cent in 2015. The fraction of participants whose ideology was mostly or strongly 
conservative (Pew score of 3 to 10) rose from 18.6 percent in 2004 to 26.9 percent 
in 2015, with most of this change occurring by 2011. The fraction whose ideology 
was mostly or strongly liberal (Pew score of −3 to −10) rose more modestly from 
32.6 percent to 35.4 percent over the  2004–2015 time frame.
Panels B and C of Table 1 documents that both levels of and changes in political 
beliefs vary markedly by race and ethnicity. The rightward shift in ideology evident 
in panel A of the table is due almost entirely to the preferences of  non-Hispanic 
Whites. Between 2004 and 2015, the share of Whites with conservative beliefs rose 
sharply from 22.2 percent to 35.0 percent, while among Hispanics and  non-Whites, 
the prevalence of liberal beliefs increased from 37.3  percent to 44.0  percent. In 
both cases, the rise in the share of group members with strongly ideological affili-
ations (liberal or conservative) is fully offset by a reduction in those holding mod-
erate views.15 These patterns revealing increasing polarization of  left-right beliefs 
14 Changing a survey response from  left-leaning to  right-leaning raises the ideology score by 2  points (+1 
instead of −1); the increase in average score by 0.30 corresponds to  0.30/2 = 0.15 additional  right-leaning 
answers per person.
15 The mean ideology score of White  non-Hispanics increased from −0.63 to 0.09 from 2004 to 2015, corre-
sponding to one more  right-leaning answer for every three respondents. Simultaneously, the mean ideology score of 
Table 1—Levels of and Changes in Ideological Affiliations of US Residents, 
Overall and by White Non-Hispanic Status, between 2004 and 2015 Using Pew Ideology Score 
Mean score Percent liberal Percent moderate Percent conservative
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. All races and ethnicities
2004 −0.91 32.6 48.7 18.6
2011 −0.30 31.2 42.2 26.6
2014 −0.59 34.5 39.3 26.2
2015 −0.61 35.4 37.6 26.9
Δ2004–2015 0.30 2.8 −11.1 8.3
Panel B. Non-Hispanic Whites
2004 −0.63 30.9 46.9 22.2
2011 0.39 27.1 38.7 34.1
2014 0.02 30.9 36.0 33.1
2015 0.09 31.0 33.9 35.0
Δ2004–2015 0.71 0.1 −13.0 12.9
Panel C. Hispanics and non-Whites
2004 −1.65 37.3 53.5 9.2
2011 −1.83 40.1 49.7 10.2
2014 −1.92 42.3 46.5 11.3
2015 −1.97 44.0 44.8 11.1
Δ2004–2015 −0.32 6.7 −8.6 1.9
Notes: The Pew Ideology score ranges from −10 (most liberal) to +10 (most conservative). Columns 2–4 define 
liberals as those with scores of −10 to −3, moderates as those with scores from −2 to 2, and conservatives as those 
with scores from 3 to 10. Sample sizes of survey respondents living in the 48 mainland states are 2,000 in 2004, 
3,029 in 2011, 9,919 in 2014, and 5,966 in 2015. Observations are weighted by survey weights.
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between  non-Hispanic Whites and other groups provide a key motivation for our 
subsequent exploration of the potentially divergent responses among minority and 
 non-minority residents in  trade-exposed electoral districts.
B. Changes in Cable News Viewing Habits of Households
As a second measure of the ideological orientation of the American public, we 
exploit the distinct role of the  cable-TV Fox News Channel in national political 
life. In a break with  long-standing convention in network TV programming, Fox 
News, since its launch in 1996, has openly supported Republican politicians and 
viewpoints and opposed Democratic ones. Based on the documented connection 
between Fox News and conservative politics (DellaVigna and Kaplan 2007; Martin 
and Yurukoglu 2017), we use viewership of the channel as an indication of house-
hold demand for partisan media content.16 We compare ratings for Fox News with 
ratings for the other two large cable news networks, CNN and MSNBC. We focus 
on cable news networks rather than network TV news (ABC, CBS, NBC, and PBS) 
because cable news provides news programming during all or nearly all  prime-time 
hours, whereas the other networks devote only a small share of their content and 
messaging to news (typically 30 minutes nightly).
Our ratings data are from Nielsen Local TV View (Nielsen Media Research 
2018) which tracks TV viewing in US households. Nielsen measures the size of 
the audience for a given programming hour of a given TV show on a given net-
work using electronic monitors attached to household TV sets and viewer diaries. 
Nielsen ratings indicate the fraction of all  TV-owning households that are tuned 
to a particular program at a particular time. We obtained average ratings for the 
5 pm to 11 pm  time slot, Monday through Friday, which is prime-time for cable 
news programming. Our data cover 2004 to 2016, with underlying sample sizes 
ranging from  99, 000 to  119, 000 households in each month during which Nielsen 
conducts ratings “sweeps” (February, May, July, November). To align news view-
ership with the demand for political content, we focus on ratings for cable news in 
the month of November during presidential election years. Ratings for cable news 
spike during presidential election months, averaging 3.9 percent versus 2.7 percent 
in  non-election months during our sample period. The data record average ratings 
for the households of each county, which we use in later analysis to examine how 
exposure to local trade shocks affects the viewership of cable news networks.
Figure 1 shows average national November ratings for the three major cable TV 
news channels. Aggregating the networks’ viewing audience, overall ratings for 
cable TV news rose from 2.37 percent in 2004 to 3.86 percent in 2016, meaning that 
Hispanics and  non-Whites shifted leftward from −1.65 to −1.97, meaning one more  left-leaning answer for every 
six respondents. Thus, the ideological distance between Whites and other groups roughly doubled.
16 Using text analysis of TV news transcripts over 1998 to 2012 and the speech of congressional representatives 
with known ideological positions, Martin and Yurukoglu (2017) classifies the content of Fox News as strongly right 
of center, the content of CNN as modestly left of center, and the content of MSNBC as similar to CNN until 2009, 
and further left thereafter. Utilizing geographic variation in the  post-1996 rollout of access to Fox News, DellaVigna 
and Kaplan (2007) finds that, relative to towns without Fox News access, towns exposed to the channel had larger 
 1996-to-2000 gains in votes shares for GOP presidential and senatorial candidates. Martin and Yurukoglu (2017) 
documents that over the 2000 to 2012 period, the conservative slant of Fox News intensified further, and its positive 
impact on voting for the GOP strengthened.
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the average fraction of households that were tuned to a cable news channel during 
 prime-time hours in November rose by 1.5 percentage points in these 12 years. In all 
years, Fox News is the dominant network. Its ratings rose from 1.36 percent in 2004 
to 2.04 percent in 2016, while its share of cable news viewers declined modestly 
from 57.5 percent in 2004 to 52.8 percent in 2016. Since 2004, the news viewing 
of the American public has modestly polarized. Ratings during  presidential election 
months have increased more substantially for  right-leaning Fox News ( + 0.7  per-
centage points) and  left-leaning MSNBC ( + 0.5   percentage points) than for less 
stridently partisan CNN ( + 0.3  percentage points).
In online Appendix Figure S1, we separate Nielsen households according to the 
race and ethnicity of the household head and find further evidence of diverging polit-
ical leaning between  non-Hispanic Whites and other groups. The 2004 to 2016 Fox 
News gain in ratings is large among households headed by  non-Hispanic Whites and 
negligible among households headed by  non-Whites, relatively few of which are 
Fox viewers. For MSNBC, the ratings gains among  White-headed households are 
slightly smaller than among  non-White-headed households.
C. Changes in the Ideology of Campaign Contributors and Congress Members
We use the Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections (DIME; Bonica 
2013, 2018) to measure the political ideology of campaign contributors and legisla-
tors. Based on reports mandated by the Federal Electoral Commission (FEC), DIME 
tabulates campaign contributions by donor and recipient for all amounts in excess of 
$200. DIME encapsulates the ideology of campaign donors and electoral candidates 
in a campaign finance (CF) score, which is based on the solution to a spatial model 
of contributions. Bonica (2013) proposes that donors choose contributions to each 
Figure 1. November Nielsen Ratings for Cable TV News Networks, 2004–2016
Notes: Nielsen ratings indicate the fraction of all  TV-owning households that are tuned to a particular program at 
a particular time. Figure plots average ratings for the 5 pm to 11 pm  time slot, Monday through Friday, during the 
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candidate to maximize the difference between the net benefit they derive from giving 
to candidates in general and the loss they experience when giving to particular can-
didates whose ideological positions differ from their own. Applying the model to the 
universe of  FEC-registered campaign donors and candidates for state and national 
electoral offices, he estimates the ideal points for each entity in the data (i.e., campaign 
donors and candidates for elected office), which are the CF scores.
Illustrating the operation of the spatial model, the largest conservative donors, 
measured by their CF score in the DIME database, include Associated Builders and 
Contractors ( anti-environmental regulation), the National Rifle Association ( pro-gun 
rights), and the National Right to Life Political Action Committee ( anti-abortion); 
the largest liberal donors include the Association of Trial Lawyers of America 
( pro-plaintiff rights), the Service Employees International Union ( pro-labor), and 
the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees ( pro-public 
sector). Because donors in the first group give to similar candidates, few if any of 
whom are supported by donors in the second group, and vice versa, the model solu-
tion will give extreme CF scores in one direction to  donor-candidate combinations 
in the first group and extreme CF scores in the other direction to  donor-candidate 
combinations in the second group.17
Evidence indicates that the CF measure has high construct validity. Even con-
trolling for legislator party affiliation, CF scores for members of Congress are 
strongly positively correlated with the likelihood that a representative voted in favor 
of legislation deemed as conservative (e.g., stronger immigration enforcement) and 
strongly negatively correlated with the likelihood that a representative supported 
legislation deemed liberal (e.g., the Affordable Care Act): see Bonica (2019).18
Basic versions of CF scores assume that a politician’s ideology is  time-invariant 
even over a  decades-long tenure in Congress, which is unappealing for our 
analysis that studies changes in ideology over time. To address this limita-
tion, we derive  time-varying ideology scores for candidates by computing the 
 contribution-weighted-average of the  time-invariant CF donor scores of each can-
didate’s donors in each electoral cycle.19 In so doing, we follow the political sci-
ence literature in interpreting a donor’s choice of which candidates to support to be 
17 Donors who give widely to candidates, and candidates who receive contributions from a wide variety of 
donors will have intermediate CF scores. Moderate donors include corporate PACs intent on avoiding the appear-
ance of undue partisanship, such as the National Auto Dealer’s Association or the National Beer Wholesaler’s 
Association.
18 Poole and Rosenthal (1985, 2007) pioneered the use of spatial models for measuring the ideology of political 
actors, an approach that has been widely emulated and extensively applied (see, e.g., Nokken and Poole 2004; 
McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2016). Poole and Rosenthal’s original measures of legislator ideology, the Nominate 
and  DW-Nominate scores, are based on Congressional  roll-call votes. Relative to Nominate scores, a key advantage 
of the Campaign Finance (CF) used in this paper is that it measures the ideological affiliations of both election 
winners (who subsequently cast votes in Congress) and for the entire pool of campaign donors (measuring partisan 
engagement), irrespective of whether their candidate prevails. This enables our study of the effect of trade exposure 
on the ideological affiliation of both donors and the candidates elected.
19 The computation of legislator ideal points from  roll-call votes faces the challenge that each Congress votes 
on a different set of bills that represent different topical issues to a varying degree (Bonica 2017). Comparing the 
ideology of legislators who have served in different Congresses and never cast votes on the same bills requires 
strong parametric restrictions on the change over time in ideology of legislators who served in multiple Congresses. 
The  time-varying  DW-Nominate score of Poole and Rosenthal (2007), which we studied in an earlier version of this 
paper (Autor et al. 2016), applies a linear time trend. During the period of 2002 to 2010, there is a high correlation 
of 0.66 between the change in the  time-varying CF score and the change in the  linear-trend  DW-Nominate, and both 
legislator ideology scores yield similar results in our empirical analysis, as documented in Section IVB.
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a genuine expression of the donor’s ideology (Bonica 2013; McCarty, Poole, and 
Rosenthal 2016). Aggregating over contributions to candidates in a given election 
reveals the relative demand for ideology by donors in that election, and aggregating 
over the CF scores of donors to a particular candidate reveals the relative demand for 
that candidate’s ideological position. For the Congress elected in 2002, the correla-
tion between our  time-varying legislator  CF-score and the  time-invariant  CF-score 
of Bonica (2013) is 0.97, while the correlation with the  time-varying  DW-Nominate 
score of Poole and Rosenthal (2007) is 0.92.
Figure 2 summarizes campaign contributions to all candidates in primary and 
general congressional elections from 2002 to 2016, where we group donors based 
on terciles of CF scores in 2002. The first tercile comprises the most liberal donors, 
while the third tercile comprises the most conservative donors. By construction, 
each group accounts for  one-third of contributions in the initial year, 2002. Over 
time, the contribution shares of each group will deviate from  one-third, if contribut-
ing donors skew to the right and (or) to the left. Such skewing is abundantly evident: 
the share of contributions by conservative (third tercile) donors rises to 0.42 in 2010, 
a level maintained through 2016; the share of contributions by liberal (first tercile) 
donors first rises to 0.42 in 2008 and then declines to 0.35 in 2010, a level main-
tained through 2016. These changes imply that the share of contributions by centrist 
donors has declined over time, dropping to 0.23 in 2010 and remaining at that level 
through 2016. The composition of campaign contributions has thus become more 
polarized.
The DIME database identifies whether donors are individuals, corporations, or 
 noncorporate organizations (e.g., labor unions;  single-issue,  single-candidate or 
 single-party political action committees). Over 2002 to 2016, donations by indi-
viduals remained roughly stable at around  one-half of all contributions, while the 
corporation share in contributions fell (from 27.9 percent to 11.0 percent) and the 
Figure 2. Polarization in Campaign Financing by Campaign Donor Type, 2002–2016
Notes: Calculations based on Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections (DIME; Bonica 2013). Donor 
ideology is divided into ideology terciles based on campaign contributions in 2002 ranked by  dollar-weighted CF 
scores. Liberal, moderate, and conservative donors have CF scores that respectively fall into the first, second, and 
third tercile of the CF score distribution. The height of each bar in each reported year reflects the share of all con-
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 noncorporate-organization share rose (from 19.9 percent to 37.7 percent). In online 
Appendix Figure S2, we decompose these contributions by donor type according to 
the same  CF-score terciles used in Figure 2.20 Online Appendix Figure S2 reveals 
cleavages in ideological positioning by donor type. While centrist donors dominate 
among corporations, perhaps reflecting the desire of business to remain in the good 
graces of whichever party is in control of Congress, liberals and conservatives domi-
nate among individual and  noncorporate donors.21 Over time, the share of moderates 
in contributions by type fell for both corporations and individuals, while it rose from 
low levels among  noncorporate organizations. The share of conservatives in contri-
butions rose most strongly for  noncorporate organizations. In concert, rightward and 
leftward shifts in aggregate contributions by individual donors have combined with 
a rightward shift in  noncorporate donors and a decline in (relatively moderate) cor-
porate donations to generate the polarization of campaign finance seen in Figure 2.
Figure 3 depicts the well-known pattern of partisan polarization in the House of 
Representatives. We plot the central tendency of  contribution-weighted-average CF 
scores for Democratic and Republican congressional election winners from 1992 
to 2016, where we normalize CF scores by the  party-specific mean CF score in 
1992 in order to highlight  between-party polarization. Ideological polarization is 
20 We continue to define the boundaries of CF terciles across all donors to facilitate comparisons across donor 
categories. Consequently, donations by individuals, corporations, and organizations may be unequally distributed 
across these terciles, even in the initial year, 2002.
21 Bonica (2016) shows that whereas corporate political action committees tend to have moderate CF scores, the 
scores of corporate executives and directors are decidedly more ideological, with a strong majority of these elites 
giving to GOP candidates and having relatively high (i.e., conservative) CF scores. In the 2000s and 2010s, nearly 
all senior executives and directors of Fortune 500 companies gave to political campaigns.
Figure 3. Polarization in Campaign Finance Scores for Congressional Legislators, 1992–2016
Notes: Figure reports the central tendency of  contribution-weighted-average CF scores of campaign donors for 
Democratic and Republican congressional election winners from 1992 to 2016, where CF scores are normalized 
by the  party-specific mean CF score in 1992. The initial mean CF score for congressional legislators was 0.40 
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thus evident whether we examine the ideological composition of campaign donors 
or average ideology by party among elected representatives.22
II. Measuring Local Economic and Political Change
In our analysis of Congressional elections, we examine changes over 2002 to 
2016 in the ideological positioning of contributors to election campaigns and the 
candidates who win these elections. Within our period, the 2002 and 2010 elec-
tions are respectively the first and last whose congressional district boundaries are 
based on the 2000 Census. In 2012, states defined new districts, based on population 
counts in the 2010 Census and the constitutional mandate that each district con-
tain approximately  1/435 of the US population. When analyzing 2002 to 2010, we 
study a period that spans the primary force of the China trade shock (Autor, Dorn, 
and Hanson 2016; Brandt et  al. 2017), and within which district boundaries are 
largely stable. When extending our analysis beyond 2010, we address the longer 
run impacts of economic shocks on electoral outcomes, but must confront the mea-
surement inconsistencies created by redistricting. To balance concerns over mea-
surement error due to redistricting with interest in the persistence of shocks on our 
outcomes, we study both the  2002–2010 and  2002–2016 periods. In most cases, we 
omit observations spanning the  2010–2012 seam except for the small set of districts 
that retain consistent boundaries during this window.
A. Local Labor Market Exposure to Trade
Our empirical analysis employs the specification of local trade exposure in com-
muting zones (CZs) derived by Autor et al. (2014) and Acemoglu et al. (2016). CZs 
are clusters of adjoining counties that have the commuting structure of a local labor 
market (Tolbert and Sizer 1996; Dorn 2009). For each CZ  j , we measure the shock 
experienced by a local labor market as the average change in Chinese import pene-
tration in that CZ’s industries, weighted by the share of each industry  k in the CZ’s 
initial employment:
(1)  ΔI P jτ 




   
 L jkt 
 _ L jt 
 ΔI P kτ 
cu.
In this expression,  ΔI P kτ 
cu = Δ  M kτ 
cu/( Y k0 +  M k0 −  X k0 ) is the growth of Chinese 
import penetration in the United States for an industry  k over period  τ , computed 
as the growth in US imports from China during the outcome period,  Δ  M kτ 
cu, divided 
by initial absorption (US industry shipments plus net imports,  Y k0 +  M k0 −  X k0 ) in 
22 Over 1992 to 2016, the mean CF score for congressional representatives is roughly centered on zero 
( μ = 0.11 ,  σ = 0.52 in the average year). Naturally, parties already demonstrated strong ideological differences 
in 1992. The initial mean CF score for GOP congressional legislators was 0.40 ( σ = 0.20 ), whereas that for 
Democrats was  − 0.23 ( σ = 0.26 ). Republican legislators have become more conservative in terms of the donors 
that support their elections, with their average CF score rising by 0.10 from 1992 to 2002 and by 0.10 again 
from 2002 to 2016, with the total  1992–2016 change equal to 1 ( [0.60 − 0.40]/0.20 ) standard deviation of the 
Republican CF score in the initial year. Democrats have become more liberal, with average CF scores falling 
by 0.14 from 1992 to 2002 and by 0.02 from 2002 to in 2016, where the total drop equals nearly two-thirds 
( [0.39 − 0.23]/0.26 ) of a  standard deviation.
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the base period 1991, near the start of China’s export boom. The fraction  L jkt / L jt is 
the share of industry  k in CZ  j ’s total employment, as measured in County Business 
Patterns data prior to the outcome period in the year 2000.
In (1), the difference in  ΔI P jτ 
cu across commuting zones stems from variation in 
local industry employment structure at the start of period  t . This variation arises 
from two sources: differential concentration of employment in manufacturing versus 
 nonmanufacturing activities and specialization in  import-intensive industries within 
local manufacturing.23 In our main specifications, we control for the  start-of-period 
manufacturing share within CZs so as to focus on variation in exposure to trade 
arising from differences in industry mix within local manufacturing.
An issue for the estimation is that realized US imports from China in (1) may be 
correlated with industry  import-demand shocks. In this case, OLS estimates of the 
relationship between changes in imports from China and changes in US manufac-
turing employment may understate the impact of the pure supply shock component 
of rising Chinese import competition, as both US employment and imports may rise 
simultaneously in the face of unobserved positive shocks to US product demand. To 
identify the causal effect of rising Chinese import exposure on  local-level political 
outcomes, we employ an  instrumental-variables strategy that accounts for the poten-
tial endogeneity of US trade exposure. We exploit the fact that during our sample 
period, much of the growth in Chinese imports stems from the rising competitive-
ness of Chinese manufacturers, which is a supply shock from the perspective of US 
producers. China’s lowering of trade barriers (Bai, Krishna, and Ma 2017), disman-
tling of the constraints associated with central planning (Naughton 2007; Hsieh and 
Song 2015), and accession to the WTO (Pierce and Schott 2016; Handley and Limão 
2017) have contributed to an immense increase in the country’s manufacturing pro-
ductivity and a concomitant rise in the country’s manufacturing exports (Hsieh and 
Ossa 2016; Brandt et  al. 2017).24 China’s aggressive market opening appears to 
have ended in the late 2000s (Naughton 2018; Lardy 2019), after which point the 
government took a heavier hand in guiding the country’s industrial development.
We identify the  supply-driven component of Chinese imports by instrument-
ing for growth in Chinese imports to the United States using the contemporaneous 
composition and growth of Chinese imports in eight other developed countries.25 
Specifically, we instrument the measured  import-exposure variable  ΔI P jτ 
cu with a 
 non-US exposure variable  ΔI P jτ 
co that is constructed using data on  industry-level 
growth of Chinese exports to other  high-income markets:
(2)  ΔI P jτ 





 L jkt−10 
 _ L jt−10 
 ΔI P kτ 
co.
This expression for  non-US exposure to Chinese imports differs from the expression 
in equation (1) in two respects. In place of US imports by industry ( Δ M kτ 
cu) in the 
23 Differences in manufacturing employment are not the primary source of variation. In a bivariate regression, 
the  start-of-period manufacturing employment share explains less than 40 percent of the variation in  ΔI P jτ 
cu .
24 China may have intentionally undervalued its exchange rate in the early 2000s, which may have contributed 
to its export growth in the first half of the decade (Bergsten and Gagnon 2017).
25 These eight other  high-income countries are those that have comparable trade data covering the full sample 
period: Australia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Spain, and Switzerland.
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computation of  industry-level import penetration  ΔI P kτ 
cu, it uses realized imports 
from China by other  high-income markets ( Δ M kτ 
co) in  ΔI P kτ 
co, and it replaces all other 
variables with lagged values to mitigate any simultaneity bias.26 As documented by 
Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2016), all eight comparison countries used for the instru-
mental variables analysis witnessed import growth from China in at least 343 of the 
397 total set of  four-digit SIC manufacturing industries. Moreover,  cross-country, 
 cross-industry patterns of imports are strongly correlated with the United States, 
with correlation coefficients ranging from 0.55 (Switzerland) to 0.96 (Australia). 
That China made comparable gains in penetration by detailed sector across numer-
ous countries in the same time interval suggests that China’s falling prices, rising 
quality, and declining trade costs in these surging sectors are root causes of its man-
ufacturing export growth.27 Because China’s  market-oriented reforms accelerated 
with its WTO accession in 2001 and had largely run their course by the end of the 
2000s, we define our measure of the China trade shock in (1) and our instrument for 
this shock in (2) to span the period 2002 to 2010.
Data on international trade are from the UN Comtrade Database, which gives 
bilateral imports for  six-digit HS products.28 To concord these data to  four-digit SIC 
industries, we first apply the crosswalk in Pierce and Schott (2012), which assigns 
 ten-digit HS products to  four-digit SIC industries (at which level each HS product 
maps into a single SIC industry), and then aggregate to  six-digit HS products and 
 four-digit SIC industries (at which level some HS products map into multiple SIC 
entries). For this aggregation, we use data on US import values at the  ten-digit HS 
level, averaged over 1995 to 2005. Dollar amounts are inflated to dollar values in 
2015 using the PCE deflator. Data on CZ employment by industry from the County 
Business Patterns for the years 1990 and 2000 is used to compute employment 
shares by industry in (1) and (2).
Online Appendix Table S2 summarizes trade exposure defined at the CZ level, 
which we then match to, variously, Nielsen households by CZ of residence, electoral 
outcomes in  county-congressional district cells, and voting results by CZ in presi-
dential elections. Through most of our analysis, we use the 2002 to 2010 period to 
characterize the rise in import competition from China.29 This period corresponds 
with China’s  post-WTO-accession productivity boom and its most intense increase 
in import penetration in the United States. On average, Chinese import penetra-
tion grew by 0.71 percentage points between 2002 and 2010 (column 1 of online 
Appendix Table S2). In Section III, we use the interquartile range of the increase 
in trade exposure as a metric to scale estimated treatments of trade exposure on 
26 The  start-of-period employment shares  L jkt / L jt are replaced by their  10-year lag, while initial absorption in the 
expression for  industry-level import penetration is replaced by its  3-year lag.
27 A potential concern for our analysis is that it ignores US exports to China, focusing instead on trade flows 
in the opposite direction. This focus is dictated by the fact that our instrument, by construction, has less predictive 
power for US exports to China. To a first approximation, China’s economic growth during the 1990s and 2000s 
generated a substantial shock to the supply of US imports but only a modest change in the demand for US exports. 
During our sample period, imports from China were nearly five times as large as manufacturing exports from the 
United States to China.
28 See http://comtrade.un.org/db/default.aspx.
29 The 2002 to 2010 window is the initial outcome period for our analysis of congressional elections. We also 
study presidential elections starting from 2000 to 2008 and beyond, and correspondingly measure the growth of 
import competition over the period of 2000 to 2008 there.
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 political outcomes in more- versus  less-exposed districts. This range is 0.49 percent-
age points across the full set of congressional districts in our analysis.
B. Political Outcomes in  County-by-Congressional-District Cells
To map economic outcomes in commuting zones to political outcomes in con-
gressional districts, we define the geographic unit of our main analysis to be the 
 county-by-congressional-district cell. The building blocks of congressional districts 
are census tracts, whose amalgamation allows officials to construct districts that 
meet the requirements of contiguity and equal population size within a state. The 
resulting map of congressional districts frequently splits counties and CZs between 
multiple districts. We overlay this map with the map of county boundaries to obtain 
 county-by-district cells, which allow us to nest the geographies of economic and 
political outcomes. We ascribe to each  county-district cell the  CZ-level trade shock 
that corresponds to the county and weight each cell by its share of the  voting-age 
population in the district, such that each congressional district has equal weight in 
the analysis. If a district spans multiple CZs, the economic factors that are mapped 
to the district will be a  population-share-weighted average of the values in these 
CZs.30
To illustrate how we construct  country-by-congressional-district cells, consider 
North Carolina’s 12th congressional district, which connects parts of the cities of 
Charlotte, Greensboro, and  Winston-Salem along a narrow corridor (see online 
Appendix Figure S3). Rowan County overlaps with the 12th district in its center, 
but also with the 5th district in its northwest, and with the 8th district in its southeast. 
Our data contain a separate observation for each of these  county-district cells. To 
each cell, we attach information on the elected representatives for the correspond-
ing district (for cells in Rowan Country from the 5th, 8th, or 12th), and the eco-
nomic conditions of the commuting zone (Charlotte) to which the county (Rowan) 
belongs. In our analysis, the weight attached to each cell equals the cell’s share of 
the  voting-age population in its corresponding congressional district.
Data on election outcomes in  county-district cells are from Dave Leip’s Atlas of 
US Elections (Leip 2017) which tracks votes received by Democratic, Republican, 
and other candidates for Congress in each county within each congressional district, 
and in each election year. We use these data to tabulate the shares of votes won 
by Democratic and GOP congressional candidates in each  county-by-district cell 
in 2002, as well as the change in these values between 2002 and later years. The 
Leip data also provide the number of registered voters at the county level, which 
allows us to compute voter turnout by county.31 The information from the DIME 
database (Bonica 2013, 2014) on campaign contributions and the inferred ideology 
of congressional legislators matches into our  county-by-district geography at the 
congressional district level.
30 From the full sample of 435 congressional districts, we omit Alaska’s one congressional district and 
Hawaii’s two congressional districts because CZs are difficult to define for these states. The resulting set of 3,772 
 county-district cells covers all 432 congressional districts on the US mainland.
31 Data on registered voters are missing in some years for Georgia, Mississippi, North Dakota, and Wisconsin. 
These four states are omitted from our empirical analysis of voter turnout.
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In addition to our analysis of congressional elections, we also study Leip data on 
vote shares in presidential elections, Nielsen data on TV consumption, and survey 
responses from PEW. All of these data are reported at the level of counties, and do 
not depend on the (changing) boundaries of congressional districts. In our analysis 
of presidential voting, we use  county-level vote shares for the nominees of the two 
major parties in 2000, 2008, and 2016.
C. Adjusting for Redistricting
The initial period for our analysis of congressional elections is 2002 to 2010. This 
period encompasses the most rapid rise of import competition from China, and the 
measurement of changes in  district-level outcomes is facilitated by stable district 
boundaries in almost all states. Appendix Table A1 shows the extent of redistricting 
in congressional elections from 2002 to 2016. In the period of 2002 to 2010, only 
four states implemented adjustments to their district boundaries. Between 2010 and 
2012, however, nearly all districts on the US mainland (425 out of 432) changed 
boundaries. To extend our analysis beyond 2010 by including outcomes from con-
gressional elections in 2012, 2014, and 2016, we thus need to account for the sweep-
ing congressional redistricting of 2012.
To match  county-by-congressional-district cells across time, we construct a new 
crosswalk that apportions  county-district cells for the 113th  Congress (elected 
in 2012), and the next two congresses, to  county-district cells as defined for the 
108th Congress (elected in 2002). We begin by splitting each  county-district cell 
of the 113th Congress into Census Blocks of the 2010 Census. We next create a 
weighted crosswalk between 2010 Census Blocks and 2000 Census Blocks, which 
indicates the fraction of population of a 2000 Block that maps into the boundaries of 
a given 2010 Block. The 2000 Blocks in turn can be mapped to  county-district cells 
for the 108th Congress. We finally aggregate the  Block-to-Block crosswalk to the 
level of  county-district cells, such that the final crosswalk indicates the fraction of 
population (measured in 2000) of a  county-district cell for the 108th Congress whose 
location of residence falls into a given  county-district cell for the 113th Congress. 
We also construct similar crosswalks to account for several intracensal period epi-
sodes of redistricting of individual states in the elections of 2004, 2006, and 2016.32
The crosswalks allow us to map outcomes from years following redistricting into 
the boundaries of the initial  county-district cells for the 108th Congress. However, 
we need to additionally address the fact that redistricting elevates churning in politi-
cal outcomes. Panel B of Appendix Table A1 indicates the fraction of congressional 
districts that replaced a Democratic representative with a Republican or vice versa, 
separately for districts that changed boundaries and those that did not. In each elec-
tion following redistricting (in 2004, 2006, 2012, and 2016), districts with bound-
ary changes experienced much greater levels of party churning than those whose 
geography remained unchanged. Averaging over these elections, 1 out of every 6 
districts with boundary changes (15.7 percent) switched parties, while only 1 out of 
every 26 districts without boundary change (3.8 percent) did so. The much higher 
32 To construct our crosswalks of  county-district cells, we draw on data of the Census Bureau, the Missouri 
Census Data Center, and the IPUMS National Historical Geographic Information System.
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churning in the former group of districts is likely a consequence of redistricting, 
rather than an expression of rapidly changing political preferences among voters in 
these districts.33
To purge the considerable noise caused by redistricting, we compute changes in 
outcome variables that omit any  two-year period during which a district changed its 
boundaries. Our outcome variables thus take the form
(3)  Δ Y cdτ 
r =  ∑ 
t∈τ
 (1 −  R dt+2 ) ( ∑ d′ 
 
  





 p cdd′  ___ p cd   Y cd′t ) ,
where  Δ Y cdτ 
r is the  redistricting-adjusted change of an outcome  Y over a period  τ for 
the cell of county  c and district  d of the 108th Congress. The variable  Y cd′t indicates 
the level of the same outcome variable in a year  t that is the start year of a  two-year 
period contained in period  τ . It is measured for county  c and the districts  d′ that are 
used during the election in year  t . The fraction  p cdd′ / p cd indicates the population 
share of the initial  county-district cell  cd that maps to the new  county-district cell  cd′ , 
and  R dt+2 is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if district  d experienced 
boundary changes in election year  t + 2 .34 If a district experienced no boundary 
changes during outcome period  τ , then  d′ = d ,  p cdd′ / p cd = 1 , and  R dt+2 = 0 , so 
that equation (3) simplifies to  Δ Y cdτ 
r =  ∑ t∈τ 
  ( Y cdt+2 −  Y cdt ) . This sum of  two-year 
changes contained in period  τ is equivalent to the first difference of outcome vari-
able  Y between the start and end of period  τ . Since there was little redistricting from 
2002 to 2010, outcome variables during our main period of analysis correspond to 
simple first differences in most states.35
III. Impact of Trade Shocks on Political Expression
We now evaluate how greater trade exposure affects political expression, resource 
mobilization for electoral campaigns, and the political orientation of candidates who 
33 Consider the example of Montgomery County, Alabama. From the 108th Congress (elected in 2002) to the 
112th Congress (elected in 2010), the northwestern part of the county, which includes most of the state capital city 
of Montgomery, belonged to Alabama’s 2nd district while the more rural southwestern part belonged to the 3rd dis-
trict. Both districts elected GOP candidates in 2010, and after redistricting in 2012, the entire congressional dele-
gation of Alabama was reelected. Despite this maximum stability in election outcomes from 2010 to 2012, some 
residents of Montgomery County were no longer represented by the same politician or even the by same party after 
the 2012 election. The 2012 redistricting moved large swaths of  inner-city Montgomery from the 2nd and 3rd to 
the 7th district, which is Alabama’s only district with a majority Black population. According to our  county-district 
crosswalk, 15 percent of the Montgomery County residents who belonged to the 2nd district until 2010 found them-
selves in the  Democrat-controlled 7th district as of 2012. This change in party is likely a mechanical outcome of 
redistricting, and not informative about changes in the political views of Montgomery County residents.
34 We restrict the value of  Δ Y cdτ 
r to lie within the range of values that could be observed for a  non-adjusted 
change of that outcome. For instance, adjusted changes in party vote shares are restricted to −100  percent or 
+100 percent in the rare cases where equation (3) yields an adjusted change of more than 100 percent.
35 Consider the change in the Republican vote share over the period 2002 to 2016 for the overlap between 
Montgomery County and Alabama’s 2nd district of the 108th Congress. Adding up over the four  two-year peri-
ods from 2002 to 2010, the Republican vote share declined from 64 percent in 2002 to 41 percent in 2010 in this 
cell. We omit the  two-year change during redistricting in  2010–2012, and then compute the subsequent change in 
Republican vote share from 2012 to 2016 as a weighted average of the change in the 85 percent overlap of the cell 
with the new 2nd district (where the Republican share increased from 47 percent in 2012 to 58 percent in 2016) 
and the 15 percent overlap the new 7th district (where the Republican vote share declined from 4 percent in 2012 to 
0 percent in 2016). The  redistricting-adjusted change in Republican vote share during the 2002 to 2016 period is thus 
 (41% − 64%) + 0.85(58% − 47%) + 0.15(0% − 4%) = − 14% .
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win congressional elections and presidential contests. We proceed in three stages: 
by examining changes in media viewership and campaign contributions in this sec-
tion; by considering congressional election outcomes in Section IV; and by assess-
ing presidential voting in Section V.36
A. Cable News Market Shares for Fox, CNN, and MSNBC
We first assess how trade exposure affects political expression using Nielsen data 
on the  cable-news-viewing habits of US households. The rankings of cable news 
channels indicate household relative demand for ideological content. According 
to FiveThirtyEight.com, the percentage of Fox News viewers who voted for the 
GOP presidential candidate exceeded the percentage of viewers who voted for the 
Democratic candidate by the stunning margins of 62 percent in 2004 and 66 per-
cent in 2016.37 Viewers of CNN and MSNBC tend to lean Democratic. CNN and 
MSNBC viewers favored the Democratic over the GOP presidential candidate by 
32 percent and 28 percent, respectively, in 2004, and by the wider margins of 47 per-
cent and 70 percent, respectively, in 2016.
Because the  cross-sectional Nielsen data preclude longitudinal analysis of indi-
vidual viewers, we aggregate data on households by CZ and  age-race groups to 
study whether news viewership changed differentially in CZs that faced greater trade 
exposure. Specifically, we aggregate the Nielsen data to the level of CZ  i by  age-race 
group  g (based on the household head ages  18–34,  35–54, 55+ for  non-Hispanic 
Whites and those with other race/ethnicity) by time period  t (weekday  prime-time 
hours during  28-day windows in November of two presidential election years  t =  t 1 
and  t =  t 2 ). The estimating equation is
(4)  Y jgt =  γ j +  γ g +  γ t +  β 1 ΔI P jτ 
cu × 1 [t =  t 2 ] 
 +  γ g × 1 [t =  t 2 ] +  β 2  X j t 1  × 1 [t =  t 2 ] +  ϵ jgt .
The dependent variable  Y jgt is either the combined rating of the three major news 
channels or the  cable-news market share of a given channel (both in percentage 
points), measured for each CZ and  age-race group in two time periods (November 
2004 and November 2008, 2012, or 2016). We control for CZ,  age-race group 
and  time-period main effects ( γ j ,  γ g ,  γ t ) and interact the  age-race-group indica-
tors with the time dummy ( γ g × 1[t =  t 2 ] ) to allow for time trends in TV prefer-
ences within these groups. The  2002–2010 import shock  ΔI P jτ 
cu is interacted with a 
dummy variable  1[t =  t 2 ] indicating the end period of the analysis, and we allow 
for  region-specific time trends in a vector of control variables  X j t 1  via an interaction 
with the time dummy  1[t =  t 2 ] . This control vector includes dummy variables for 
the Census geographic division to which CZ  j belongs,  start-of-period economic 
36 In online Appendix Table S14, we explore the effect of import competition on changes in political beliefs at 
the  CZ-level using data from the Pew survey summarized above. The results from this analysis qualitatively align 
with those from Section IIIA on cable news market shares, but they lack precision because the survey data contain 
only a small number of  individual-level observations per CZ.
37 See Harry Enten, “How Roger Ailes Polarized TV News,” FiveThirtyEight, May 19, 2017, https://
fivethirtyeight.com/features/ how-roger-ailes-polarized-tv-news/.
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conditions in CZ  j (the share of manufacturing in CZ employment, the offshorability 
index and the Autor and Dorn (2013)  routine-task-intensity index for CZ occupa-
tions, each measured in 2000) and  start-of-period political conditions in CZ  j (the 
 two-party vote share of the Republican nominee in the 1996 and 2000 presidential 
elections).
We first consider the years 2004 and 2012, a time period that overlaps with the 
2002 to 2010 period for which we begin our analysis of congressional elections.38 
Panel A of Table 2 shows that greater exposure to import competition triggers little 
change in the combined rating of the three cable news channels. The coefficient on 
38 Nielsen data were not available prior to 2004.
Table 2—Exposure to Chinese Import Competition and Cable TV News Viewership, November  
2004–November 2012 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. Combined Nielsen rating of TV news networks
ΔCZ import penetration × [t = 2012] −0.18 −0.10 0.67 0.54 0.16 0.03
(0.09) (0.17) (0.37) (0.37) (0.40) (0.41)
Panel B. Market share Fox News
ΔCZ import penetration × [t = 2012] 2.86 5.87 5.09 7.31 8.32 10.48
(1.49) (2.77) (5.03) (4.81) (5.21) (5.30)
Panel C. Market share CNN
ΔCZ import penetration × [t = 2012] −0.51 −1.28 −6.51 −5.37 −4.34 −4.20
(1.25) (2.03) (3.73) (3.44) (3.47) (3.36)
Panel D. Market share MSNBC
ΔCZ import penetration × [t = 2012] −2.34 −4.58 1.42 −1.95 −3.98 −6.28
(1.47) (1.96) (3.94) (3.14) (3.46) (3.72)
Estimation method OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
F-statistic first stage 45.4 40.6 38.3 27.7 27.7
CZ fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age-race group fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
CZ industry/occ × [t = 2012] Yes Yes Yes Yes
Presidential election controls × [t = 2012] Yes Yes Yes
Census divisions × [t = 2012] Yes Yes
Age-race group fixed effects × [t = 2012] Yes
Notes: Dependent variables: change in TV rating or news channel market share (in percentage points). 
Observations = 6,923 CZ-year-age-race cells in Panel A and observations = 5, 079 cells in panels B–D. The 
Combined Nielsen Rating in panel A indicates the percentage of households that own TVs that were watching one 
of the three major TV news networks. Panels B–D indicate the market share of each major TV news network in their 
combined market. In November 2004, the average combined rating was 2.5 percent, and the TV news market shares 
were 59.2 percent for Fox News, 27.7 percent for CNN, and 13.1 percent for MSNBC. All regressions control for 
commuting zone, year, and age-race (three age times two race groups) fixed effects. Industry and occupation con-
trols in column 3 include the fraction of CZ employment in the manufacturing sector and the Autor and Dorn (2013) 
routine share and offshorability index of a CZ’s occupations, all of which are measured in 2000 and interacted with 
the dummy for the 2012 period. Election controls in column 4 comprise the Republican two-party vote shares of the 
CZ in the presidential elections of 1996 and 2000, each interacted with the period dummy. Census division dummies 
interacted with the period dummy in column 5 allow for different time trends across the nine geographical Census 
divisions. Age-race-time interactions in column 6 allow for different time trends by age-race group. Observations are 
weighted by Nielsen’s estimate of the number of TV households in each cell, and standard errors are clustered on CZs.
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the  trade-shock,  end-year interaction is positive and marginally significant in the 
column 3 regression only, and falls to near zero and becomes highly imprecisely 
estimated when full controls are added in column 6. These results indicate that there 
is no apparent effect of trade shocks on households’ overall consumption of TV 
news, even though cable news viewership does rise in the aggregate across CZs 
during the sample period.
In panels B to D of Table 2, we examine how greater trade exposure affects the 
market share of individual  cable-news channels. Consider the results for Fox News 
in panel B. In column 1, we estimate a parsimonious OLS regression that controls for 
CZ,  age-race group, and year fixed effects only. The coefficient estimate is positive 
and significant at the 10 percent level ( t = 1.92 ). Turning to the 2SLS regression in 
column 2, the  trade-shock coefficient estimate doubles in magnitude and becomes 
more precisely estimated ( t = 2.12 ). In the Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013a) 
analysis of the labor market impact of increased import competition from China, 
instrumental variables regressions consistently indicate more adverse impacts of 
trade than OLS regressions. To the extent that import shocks affect political beliefs 
via deteriorating labor market conditions, one would expect the greater impact of 
imports on ideology when moving from OLS in column 1 to 2SLS in column 2. 
The column 2 estimates indicate that CZs with a  1 percentage-point larger increase 
in trade exposure had a 5.9  percentage-point larger Fox News market share in 2012 
relative to 2004, a period during which Fox News’  presidential-election-month rat-
ings rose but its market share fell modestly. Once we include the full set of controls 
for economic and political conditions in column  5, the  trade-shock impact rises 
to 10.5 percentage points ( t = 2.00 ), which implies that when comparing CZs at 
the seventy-fifth versus twenty-fifth percentiles of trade exposure, the former would 
have a 5.2  percentage-point ( 10.5 × 0.49 ) larger increase in the market share of Fox 
News.
That trade shocks have a positive impact on the Fox News market share implies 
that they must diminish market shares for CNN and (or) MSNBC, evidence for 
which we see in panels C and D of Table 2. The results in column 5 with full con-
trols indicate that approximately three-fifths ( − 6.3/10.5 ) of the Fox News gain in 
market share in  trade-impacted CZs was at the expense of MSNBC while  two-fifths 
( − 4.2/10.5 ) of the Fox gain was at the expense of CNN, although only the first 
impact reaches the 10 percent significance level ( t = 1.70 ).39 We interpret these 
results to mean that greater regional exposure to import competition caused an 
increase in the relative demand for television news with a conservative political 
slant.
In online Appendix Figure  S4, we expand the analysis to the  2004–2008 and 
 2004–2016 periods, using the specification in column 6 of Table 2 with full controls. 
The results in Table  2 are fully replicated for these alternative horizons. Greater 
exposure to import competition yields no change in  cable-news viewership over-
all, while it does reallocate market share to Fox News from MSNBC and CNN. 
39 In supplementary estimates, presented in online Appendix Table S4, we expand the sample to include all 
Nielsen ratings months (February, May, July, November). In the column 6 regression with full controls, we see 
that the impact of import competition on the Fox News market share has a slightly smaller magnitude and remains 
precisely estimated when we include  non-presidential-election months in the analysis.
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The impact of the trade shock on Fox News market shares for the  2004–2008 
( γ 1 = 8.8 ,  t = 2.1 ) and  2004–2016 ( γ 1 = 10.5 ,  t = 2.7 ) time periods are sim-
ilar to that for  2004–2012 ( γ 1 = 10.5 ,  t = 2.0 ), indicating that  four-fifths of the 
 long-run  trade-shock-induced impact on Fox News was realized by 2008, by which 
point the China trade shock itself had almost entirely unfolded.
Motivated by the differential trends in cable news ratings according to race and 
ethnicity, seen in online Appendix Figure S1, we report in online Appendix Table S3 
regressions in which we interact the trade shock with dummy variables for the six 
 age-race groups, where the specifications are otherwise the same as in column 6 of 
Table 2. While the trade shock appears to spur an increase in the Fox News market 
share for most  age-race groups, these gains tend to be larger and more precisely esti-
mated for  non-Hispanic Whites. For the 2004 to 2016 period, these impacts are two 
to three times larger for  non-Hispanic Whites than for the corresponding Hispanic 
and  non-White age groups.
In short, trade exposure moves the ideological needle of media consumption 
rightward among  non-minority households. We do not classify this movement as 
polarization, however, since we detect no countervailing leftward shift among other 
groups. This is one of several instances where rightward shifts appear to be the over-
riding ideological and political response to trade exposure.
B. Ideology of Congressional Campaign Donors
We next analyze the effect of rising trade exposure on political expression as 
represented by the contributions of campaign donors. Contributions reveal support 
for candidates that arises from their appeal to donors, where larger contributions 
indicate, in part, a stronger ideological match between the candidate and the donor 
(Bonica 2014; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2016). Because we know the ideol-
ogy of donors via their CF scores, we can use the distribution of contributions across 
these scores to assess the total demand for candidates at different points along the 
ideological spectrum.
In this analysis, and in our later analysis of congressional and presidential elec-
tions, we estimate equations of the form:
(5)  Δ Y cdjτ = γ +  β 1 ΔI P jτ 
cu +  X cdjt ′  β 2 +  e cdjτ ,
where dependent variable  Δ Y cdjτ is the change in an outcome for time 
period  τ (2002 to 2010 in our baseline specifications) that corresponds to 
 county-congressional-district cell  cd in CZ  j . To our  trade-exposure mea-
sure  ΔIP  jτ , we pair an expanded vector of regional controls  X cdjt , which includes 
 Census-division dummies and initial CZ economic and political conditions, as in 
regression equations (4) and (7), and now  start-of-period demographic character-
istics (population shares for nine age and four racial groups, shares of the popula-
tion that are female, college-educated, foreign-born, and Hispanic, each measured 
at the county level).
We estimate (5) using as the dependent variable the change in campaign con-
tributions for primary and general elections combined to capture the total demand 
for candidate ideology expressed during an electoral cycle. For the purpose of 
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 aggregation, we define bins based on quantiles for CF scores in 2002, match each 
donor to the bin to which the donor’s CF score corresponds, and sum contributions 
across donors in each bin in each year for each district. To allow for zero values 
in some cells, we measure the change in contributions  Δ C bjt for bin  b in district  d 
between time periods  t 1 and  t 2 as
(6)  Δ C bdτ =  
 C bd t 2  −  C bd t 1  ______________  
0.5 ×  [ C bd t 2  +  C bd t 1  ] 
,
which approximates the log change in the value.
Baseline Results for  2002–2010.—We focus first on the  2002–2010 period 
because congressional district boundaries are stable in this interval. Panel  A of 
Table 3 shows the impact of greater trade exposure on the  2002-to-2010 change 
in total campaign contributions across all donor types irrespective of ideologi-
cal affiliation across primary and general congressional elections. In column 1 of 
panel A, which includes no controls, districts with larger increases in trade expo-
sure have larger increases in contributions, where this impact is significant at the 
Table 3—Exposure to Chinese Import Competition and Campaign Contributions, 2002–2010 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A. All contributions
ΔCZ import penetration 15.84 28.69 33.30 38.97 37.23
(9.24) (21.30) (21.12) (21.23) (21.05)
Panel B. Left-wing contributions (1st tercile of donor CF score)
ΔCZ import penetration 25.22 58.26 64.68 71.05 71.00
(11.69) (27.75) (31.31) (31.10) (31.06)
Panel C. Moderate contributions (2nd tercile of donor CF score)
ΔCZ import penetration 8.77 14.34 22.19 25.29 23.60
(8.15) (18.73) (18.62) (19.70) (19.63)
Panel D. Right-wing contributions  (3rd tercile of donor CF score)
ΔCZ import penetration 9.30 34.02 44.97 49.49 46.05
(13.00) (26.94) (26.98) (27.37) (27.15)
Estimation method 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
F-statistic first stage 35.8 37.0 27.3 29.1 29.2
2000 industry/occ controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Census division dummies Yes Yes Yes
2000 demographic controls Yes Yes
1996/2000 presidential election controls Yes
Notes: Dependent variables: proportional change in contributions by donor ideology (in log points). Observations 
= 3,772 county-district cells. Proportional changes are defined according to equation (6) and approximate a log 
change. Panels B to D indicate the change in contributions from donors whose CF score falls into the first, second, 
and third tercile of the dollar-weighted distribution of donor ideology in 2002. Industry and occupation controls 
in column 2 are measured at the CZ level and comprise the fraction of CZ employment in the manufacturing sec-
tor and the Autor and Dorn (2013) routine share and offshorability index of a CZ’s occupations. Census division 
dummies in column 3 allow for different time trends across the nine geographical Census divisions. Demographic 
controls in column 4 comprise the percentage of a county’s population in nine age and four racial groups, as well 
as the population shares that are female, college-educated, foreign-born, and Hispanic. Election controls in col-
umn 5 comprise the Republican two-party vote share in the presidential elections of 1992 and 1996, measured at 
the county level. Observations are weighted by a county-district cell’s share in the total year-2000 voting age pop-
ulation of a district, so that each district has a total weight of 1. Standard errors are two-way clustered on CZs and 
congressional districts.
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10 percent level ( t = 1.71 ). As we add controls for initial economic conditions in 
column 2, geographic region in column 3, demographic characteristics in column 4, 
and political conditions in column  5, the coefficient estimate doubles in magni-
tude and remains marginally significant. The estimate with full controls in column 5 
of panel  A ( t = 1.77 ) implies that if we compare congressional districts at the 
seventy-fifth versus twenty-fifth  percentiles of trade exposure, the  more-exposed 
district would have a 18.2 percent ( 37.2 × 0.49 ) larger increase in campaign contri-
butions. If higher donations indicate more fiercely contested campaigns, then these 
results suggest that greater trade exposure increases campaign intensity.
Distinct from panel  A, the subsequent panels of Table  3 explore how trade 
shocks affect the ideological composition of campaign donations. Consider first 
panel C, which shows the impact of import competition on campaign contributions 
by relatively moderate donors, those whose CF scores fall in the middle tercile of 
CF scores as of 2002. In all specifications, the coefficient estimate is small relative 
to the panel A estimates, and imprecisely estimated ( t = 1.20 with full controls in 
column 5). By contrast, panel B shows that greater trade exposure increases con-
tributions by  left-leaning donors, defined as the sum of contributions by donors 
whose CF scores fall within the first tercile (most liberal) of 2002 CF scores. This 
impact is positive and precisely estimated in all 2SLS specifications. The coefficient 
estimate in column 5 ( t = 2.29 ) indicates that when comparing  more-versus-less 
 trade-exposed congressional districts, the  more-exposed district would have an 
approximately 35 percent ( 71.0 × 0.49 ) larger increase in campaign contributions 
by  left-leaning donors. In panel D, we see a qualitatively similar pattern of impacts 
for contributions by  right-leaning donors, defined as total contributions by donors 
whose CF scores fall within the third tercile (most conservative) of 2002 CF scores. 
In column 5, the marginally significant coefficient estimate ( t = 1.70 ) indicates 
that when comparing  more-versus-less  trade-exposed districts, the  more-exposed 
district is predicted to experience a 22.6 percent ( 46.1 × 0.49 ) larger increase in 
contributions by  right-leaning donors. These results provide our first evidence that 
greater trade exposure heightens polarization, specifically by increasing contribu-
tions among  more-partisan donors on the left and right relative to contributions by 
moderate donors.
Extended Results for  2002–2016.—Using the specification with full controls in 
column 5 of Table 3, we next estimate regressions for time periods beginning in 2002 
and ending in each congressional election year from 2004 to 2016. The dependent 
variables are those in panels B to D of Table 3, which represent changes in campaign 
contributions by 2002 terciles of donor CF scores. The trade shock variable in these 
regressions is the growth of Chinese import competition from 2002 to 2010, so that 
the results up to 2010 are informative about the timing of the changes in campaign 
contributions that Table 3 reported for the  2002–2010 period, while the results for 
subsequent years indicate the persistence of these effects. During  2002–2004 and 
 2002–2006, the full impact of the  2002–2010 China trade shock is yet to be felt; 
for the  2002–2008 and  2002–2010 periods forward, China’s  reform-driven export 
boom is largely complete. Up to 2010, congressional districts are stable and defined 
based on the distribution of population in the 2000 Census. The periods ending 
in 2012, 2014, and 2016 include elections based on congressional districts whose 
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boundaries were redrawn after the 2010 Census. Because of the need to match 
 county-congressional-district cells to CZs across periods of redistricting, as dis-
cussed in Section IIC, outcomes for these later time periods may be measured with 
more noise.40
Figure 4 summarizes these estimates. Each bar represents a coefficient from a 
separate regression while whiskers indicate 95 percent confidence intervals based 
on standard errors that are clustered both at the level of CZs and congressional 
districts.41 Consider first the impact of trade exposure for the middle tercile of cen-
trist donors. In all periods except the first,  2002–2004, the impact is positive, but it 
is always small and imprecisely estimated. Congressional districts more exposed 
to import competition see no differential increase in campaign contributions from 
moderate donors at any time horizon. Consider next the impact of trade exposure on 
contributions by  first-tercile liberal donors. These impacts are positive and precisely 
estimated in each time period.42 They are small in the first two periods, roughly 
double in magnitude value in the middle three periods,  2002–2008,  2002–2010, 
and  2002–2012, and increase further in the final two periods. When examining the 
40 As above, we discard the  two-year change in districts in which redistricting occurs, as shown in equation (3). 
Results for  2002–2012 are accordingly very similar to those for  2002–2010 since a large majority of districts 
changed boundaries between 2010 and 2012.
41 Full regression details appear in online Appendix Table S8.
42 The corresponding  t-values for the change in import competition are 1.74 for  2002–2004, 1.85 for  2002–2006, 
2.88 for  2002–2008, 2.29 for  2002–2010, 2.30 for  2002–2012, 2.66 for  2002–2014, and 2.59 for  2002–2016.
Figure 4. Exposure to Chinese Import Competition and Campaign Contributions,  2002–2004/2016
Notes: Dependent variables: 100 × proportional change in contributions by type of campaign donor. Figure reports 
estimates of equation (5) for the relationship between changes in China import exposure between 2002 and 2010 
and 100 × proportional changes in campaign contributions within ideology terciles (based on 2002 contribu-
tions, as per Figure 2) across designated year pairs. Proportional changes are defined according to equation (6) 
and approximate a log change. Each bar represents a coefficient from a separate regression while whiskers indi-
cate 95 percent confidence intervals. All regressions include the full vector of control variables from column 5 of 
Table 3. Observations are weighted by a  county-district cell’s share in the total  year-2000 voting age population of 
a district, so that each district has a total weight of 1. Standard errors are  two-way clustered on CZs and congressio-
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 long-period change,  2002–2016, the coefficient estimate of  111.8 ( t = 2.59 ) indi-
cates that when comparing  more-versus-less  trade-exposed congressional districts, 
the  more-exposed one would have 54.8 percent ( 111.8 × 0.49 ) higher campaign 
contributions by liberal  first-tercile donors, equivalent to a 0.37  standard-deviation 
change in  first-tercile contributions across districts over 2002 to 2016.
As with the  2002–2010 results, the impacts of trade exposure on campaign con-
tributions by  right-leaning donors are qualitatively similar to those for  left-leaning 
donors when we expand the time horizon. Impacts of trade exposure on increased 
contributions by conservative donors are small and imprecise in the first two time 
periods. Coefficient estimates increase substantially in magnitude and become 
significant in the  2002–2008 period, and remain comparable in subsequent peri-
ods apart from a dip in 2014.43 When examining the coefficient estimate for the 
 full-period change,  2002–2016, the now  less-precise coefficient estimate of 52.6 
( t = 1.39 ) indicates that when comparing  more-versus-less  trade-exposed districts, 
the  more-exposed one would have 25.8 percent ( 52.6 × 0.49 ) higher campaign con-
tributions by  right-leaning donors, which is equivalent to a 0.17  standard-deviation 
change in  third-tercile contributions across districts over 2002 to 2016. Overall, 
these results suggest that greater trade exposure induces a polarization in campaign 
contributions in the 2000s that is largely maintained through 2016. Contributions 
from liberal and conservative donors, but not from moderate donors, differentially 
expand in  more-trade-exposed districts.
In Appendix Figure A1, we revisit the results in Figure 4 by estimating regres-
sions in which we split counties according to whether or not a majority of their 
 voting-age residents were  non-Hispanic Whites in the 2000 Census. We repeat the 
caveat that splitting on subcategories raises the risk of false positives. We believe 
this split is nevertheless justified by the clearly divergent ideological leanings 
and partisan news viewership habits of White  non-Hispanics versus other groups 
(Section I). The lion’s share of US  county-district cells had a majority  non-Hispanic 
White population in that year: 3,491 of 3,772 cells, corresponding to 370 of the 432 
electoral districts (85.6 percent) that are used in our analysis. This demographic 
split is, not surprisingly, correlated with the political affiliation of elected represen-
tatives.44 For districts with a majority  non-Hispanic White population in panel A, 
the polarization results in Figure 4 are preserved. When considering districts with 
 majority-minority populations in panel B of Appendix Figure A1, a materially dis-
tinct pattern emerges. There is a positive and significant impact of trade exposure on 
contributions by liberal donors, which is precisely estimated for all end years from 
2006 forward. Conversely, impacts on contributions by moderate and conservative 
donors are small and imprecisely estimated in all years.
Together, our results on political expression suggest that localized economic 
shocks stemming from rising trade pressure in the 2000s increased the relative 
43 The corresponding  t-values for the change in import competition are 0.77 for  2002–2004, 0.48 for  2002–2006, 
2.30 for  2002–2008, 1.70 for  2002–2010, 1.71 for  2002–2012,  − 0.20 for  2002–2014, and 1.39 for  2002–2016.
44 Our sample comprises 3,108 counties, of which 2,924 are  majority-White.  Minority-dominated counties are 
more populous on average, so that the reported fraction of  minority-dominated districts is larger than the fraction of 
 minority-dominated counties. Majority- and  minority-dominated areas have an average trade shock value of 0.71. 
58.5 percent of the population in majority-White counties was represented by a Republican in 2002; conversely, 
76.8 percent of the population in  minority-dominated areas was represented by a Democrat in 2002.
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demand for conservative media content, support for conservative viewpoints, 
and campaign contributions by more ideologically extreme donors. Distinct from 
the media viewership data, we see clear polarization in political contributions 
in  trade-exposed districts. Our evidence on the ideological composition of cam-
paign donors supports the inference that a broad political realignment occurred in 
 trade-exposed locations in the first decade of the 2000s, as trade pressure was ris-
ing, and that it persisted through 2016. In all outcomes we have considered, these 
rightward shifts are concentrated among  non-Hispanic Whites, with small, zero, or 
countervailing effects among Hispanics and  non-Whites. We do not, however, have 
a preferred explanation for why the political realignment we identify manifests in 
polarization in the case of campaign donations versus rightward shifts in the case of 
media consumption.
IV. Impact of Trade Shocks on Congressional Election Outcomes
We now shift focus from political expression to electoral outcomes for the US 
Congress. We first consider the impact of import exposure on the standard election 
measures of voter turnout and party vote shares in congressional elections, which 
allows us to square our results with current literature. We then examine how trade 
shocks have affected the composition of election winners, measured by party affili-
ation and ideological orientation.
A. Campaign Competitiveness, Party Vote Shares, and Party Win Percentages
We initially consider how rising exposure to import competition affects the num-
ber of registered voters who cast ballots and the share of votes cast captured by the 
GOP in congressional elections. In column  1 of Table 4, the dependent variable 
is the change in fraction of registered voters who turn out to vote in the general 
congressional election, where outcomes are for the 2002 to 2010 period.45 In all 
regressions we include the full set of controls for initial economic conditions, polit-
ical conditions, and demographic characteristics, matching the specification in col-
umn 5 of Table 3. Voter turnout is higher in congressional districts subject to larger 
increases in trade exposure in their corresponding CZs. The coefficient estimate 
of  5.27 ( t = 2.72 ) implies that when comparing districts at the seventy-fifth versus 
twenty-fifth  percentiles of trade exposure, the more exposed district would have 
a 2.6   percentage-point ( 5.27 × 0.49 ) larger increase in voter turnout, relative to 
mean turnout in 2002 of 46.7 percent and a mean  2002–2010 change in turnout of 
3.3 percentage points.46 These results accord with the findings of Table 3 suggesting 
that rising trade exposure increases the intensity of electoral campaigns, as seen in 
elevated campaign contributions and voter participation.
To test whether the  trade-induced increase in electoral competitiveness tends to 
favor one political party, we report in column 2 of Table 4 an estimate for the change 
45 We continue to use regression specification (5).
46 This finding is consistent with the classic quiescence hypothesis in political science (Edelman 1971), which 
views low voter turnout as indicative of voter satisfaction, and conversely, implies that rising voter dissatisfaction 
will spur turnout. Charles and Stephens (2013) shows that US counties with lower growth of employment and 
wages experience greater electoral turnout.
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in the GOP share of  two-party vote in the general congressional election.47 Trade 
exposure has a modest negative impact on the Republican vote share, where the 
coefficient estimate is small ( − 1.1  percentage points per  percentage-point change 
in trade exposure) and imprecise. These results are broadly in line with Che et al. 
(2016), which documents vote share gains for Democrats in counties with greater 
exposure to Chinese import competition from 2002 to 2010.
Further analysis at the  county-district level allows us to identify the districts that 
accounted for these vote share gains by the Democratic party. In columns 3 to 5, we 
split districts into “safe districts” that were consistently held by the same party with 
vote shares of 55 percent or higher in each election from 2002 to 2010, and “competi-
tive” districts where neither party consistently attained at least 55 percent of the vote. 
This classification yields 129 “safe Democratic” districts, 124 “safe Republican” 
districts, and 179 “competitive” districts. Columns 3 to 5 respectively interact the 
vote share outcome of column 2 with dummies for safe Democratic, competitive, 
and safe Republican districts, such that the regression coefficients across these col-
umns add up to the total effect in column  2. The results from columns  3 and  5 
indicate that the Democratic party increased its vote share in  trade-exposed districts 
that remained under safe control of the incumbent party. Column 4 shows that the 
Republican party gained in  trade-exposed districts where both parties were competi-
tive. While none of the results from columns 2 through 5 are precisely estimated, the 
coefficient pattern suggests that modest overall vote share gains for the Democratic 
party masks gains for the Republican party in the electorally consequential subset of 
districts that were not firmly controlled by one party. Indeed, column 6 shows that 
47 The Republican  two-party vote share is the share of Republican votes among the total of Republican and 
Democratic votes. We count as a Democrat the lone independent member of Congress, Bernie Sanders of Vermont. 
On two occasions, Sanders later sought the presidential nomination of the Democratic Party.














(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Δ CZ import penetration 5.27 −1.08 −0.95 6.10 −6.24 24.08
(1.94) (5.98) (1.80) (4.93) (3.93) (12.07)
Notes: Dependent variables: change in turnout among registered voters, change in Republican two-party vote share, 
or change in Republican win probability (in percentage points). Observations = 3, 772 county-district cells, except 
observations = 2, 772 in column 1. Turnout among registered voters is measured at the county level and excludes 
counties in districts with uncontested elections in 2002 or 2010, as well as district that were redistricted in 2004 
or 2006. The Republican two-party vote share is the ratio of Republican votes to the sum of Democratic and 
Republican votes. Column 3 indicates the change in vote share in the 129 districts where the Democratic party 
maintained a two-party vote share > 55 percent in every election from 2002 to 2010. Its sets the outcome variable 
to 0 for all districts where this condition was not met. Column 5 correspondingly indicates the change in vote share 
in the 124 districts where the Republican party maintained a two-party vote share > 55 percent in every election 
from 2002 to 2010, while column 4 comprises the 179 remaining districts. All regressions include the full vector of 
control variables from column 5 of Table 3. Observations are weighted by a county-district cell’s share in the total 
year-2000 voting age population of a district, so that each district has a total weight of 1. Standard errors are two-
way clustered on CZs and congressional districts.
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Figure 5. Exposure to Chinese Import Competition and Electoral Results,  2002–2004/2016
Notes: Dependent variables: change in Republican win probability and change in Republican  two-party vote share 
(in percentage points). Estimates of equation (5) for the relationship between the change in China import exposure 
between 2002 and 2010 and (panel A) the change in the probability that a Republican is elected, and (panel B) the 
change in the Republican  two-party vote share, both measured in percentage points. Each bar represents a coeffi-
cient from a separate regression while whiskers indicate 95 percent confidence intervals. All regressions include the 
full vector of control variables from column 5 of Table 3. Observations are weighted by a  county-district cell’s share 
in the total  year-2000 voting age population of a district, so that each district has a total weight of 1. Standard errors 
are  two-way clustered on CZs and congressional districts. Full regression results are reported in online Appendix 
Table S9.
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districts more exposed to import competition became more likely to elect a GOP leg-
islator, where this impact is significant at the 5 percent level ( t = 2.00 ). Comparing 
 more-versus-less  trade-exposed congressional districts, the more exposed district 
would have a substantial 11.8   percentage-point ( 24.08 × 0.49 ) larger increase in 
the probability of electing a Republican.
Consistent with Feigenbaum and Hall (2015), we find that the contribution of 
trade shocks to GOP electoral odds did not manifest during the 2002 to 2008 period. 
In panel A of Figure 5, import competition has little effect on the party balance in 
Congress prior to 2010, as captured by its null impacts on the change in probability 
that a GOP legislator is elected over the 2002 to 2004, 2006, and 2008 time periods.48 
Electoral gains for the GOP emerge in the 2010  mid-term election, which brought 
many Tea Party Republicans into Congress, and persist thereafter. In panel A, over 
the  2002–2012,  2002–2014, and  2002–2016 time periods, greater trade exposure had 
positive and precisely estimated impacts on the incremental probability that a GOP 
candidate won the election, where the coefficient magnitudes for these  later-ending 
periods are similar to those for  2002–2010. Over these same time horizons, panel B 
shows that the  trade-exposure impact on the GOP vote share is small, negative, and 
highly imprecisely estimated, as is the case for 2002 to 2006, 2008, and 2010.49
How do we reconcile trade shocks weakly lowering the GOP vote shares in 
panel B of Figure 5 while raising GOP win probabilities in panel A? Column 4 of 
Table 4 offers suggestive evidence that the Republican party may have improved 
its electoral results in the competitive districts where a few additional percentage 
points of the vote share can prove decisive for victory. In supplemental analysis, 
we indeed find that greater trade exposure has a positive impact on the likelihood 
that Republicans win an election with a relatively narrow GOP vote margin of up to 
20 percent, while reducing the likelihood of a dominant GOP victory with a margin 
exceeding 20 percent. These outcomes accord with the results in Tables 3 and 4 on 
how trade shocks increase campaign intensity.
More competitive elections could be the consequence of parties running more 
centrist candidates against each other, who, because they compete for similar groups 
of voters, realize narrower electoral margins. Alternatively, Glaeser, Ponzetto, and 
Shapiro (2005) suggests that greater competitiveness of elections could result from 
more extreme candidates who exploit wedge issues to catalyze voter turnout and 
financial contributions among their core supporters. In the models in Grossman 
and Helpman (2018) and Gennaioli and Tabellini (2019), inflaming wedge issues 
is the rough equivalent of strengthening group identity, such as Tea Party acolytes 
48 See online Appendix Table S9 for regression details. Feigenbaum and Hall (2015) reports that through the 
Congress elected in 2008,  trade-exposed districts had no greater likelihood of a contested primary, no greater like-
lihood of a loss by the incumbent candidate, and no lower vote share for the incumbent candidate. While the paper 
did not study the electoral success of the Democratic and Republican parties in those districts, the authors observe 
that elected legislators did not systematically adjust their voting behavior in Congress apart from greater support 
for protectionist bills.
49 In online Appendix Table S5, we explore the sensitivity of the results in panel A and panel B to varying the set 
of controls included in the regression, while focusing on the time periods 2002 to 2010 and 2002 to 2016. In both 
periods, the impact of trade shocks on the change in GOP win probability increases in magnitude with the addition 
of industry and occupation controls and census division dummies, and becomes precisely estimated once the latter 
geographic variables are included. The addition of controls for initial demographic conditions and earlier presiden-
tial voting patterns has little further impact on the results. In both time periods and in all specifications, there is a 
highly imprecise relationship between trade shocks and the change in GOP vote shares.
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 declaring their opposition to immigration, affirmative action, and social protections 
for disadvantaged groups. In either case, extreme candidates, by virtue of their 
extremism, may be more likely to win elections narrowly when they prevail.
Under the plausible supposition that wedge issues in the United States divide vot-
ers along racial and ethnic lines, this latter interpretation suggests that the impact of 
trade exposure on GOP vote gains should vary systematically with districts’ racial 
and ethnic composition. We explore this possibility in online Appendix Figure S5. 
The positive impact of trade exposure on GOP electoral odds from  2002–2010 
onward stems entirely from majority  non-Hispanic-White counties, shown in 
panel A of online Appendix Figure S5. In  trade-exposed  majority-minority areas, 
Republicans achieved some gains until the  2002–2008 period, but faced small and 
imprecisely estimated losses in  2002–2010 or any subsequent period, shown in 
panel B of Figure 5. This set of results suggests, though does not prove, that the net 
electoral gains of the GOP realized in  trade-impacted districts, often with narrow 
margins of victory, are likely built on socially divisive rather than centrist campaign 
platforms.
In summary, greater trade exposure leads to sizable increases in the likelihood 
of GOP victory in majority-White  non-Hispanic congressional districts from 
 2002–2010 forward but not in  majority-minority districts. As with earlier results on 
news viewership and partisan political contributions, the rightward shifts we detect 
are concentrated among  non-Hispanic Whites.
B. Ideology of Congressional Election Winners
Party affiliation is an incomplete measure of ideological orientation. For instance, 
when a Tea-Party-affiliated representative replaces a mainstream Republican, this 
event does not register on the GOP win/lose outcome variable considered above. 
To probe these deeper distinctions, we characterize the impact of rising trade 
exposure on congressional elections according to the political party and ideologi-
cal orientation of those elected, where the ideology of winners is measured by the 
 contribution-weighted-average CF score of the donors to their election campaign. 
We define “moderate Democrats” and “moderate Republicans” as legislators whose 
 contribution-weighted-average CF score would place them in the more centrist half 
of their party’s legislators in 2002. By contrast, “liberal Democrats” have an ideol-
ogy score below the median of their party in 2002, while “conservative Republicans” 
have an ideology score above the 2002 party median.50
Figure 6 displays estimates of the impact of trade exposure on the probabil-
ity that candidates from equal ideological partitions are elected to the House of 
Representatives for time periods ranging from  2002–2004 to  2002–2016. The 
specification is that in equation (5), with full controls for initial economic condi-
tions, political conditions, and demographic characteristics. Each bar represents a 
separate regression in which the dependent variable is the change in the  likelihood 
50 DIME records campaign contributions for 96.2 percent of all election winners from 2002 to 2016. In the rare 
cases where a winner received no contributions during an electoral cycle, we impute the winner’s ideology value using 
the next previous or subsequent election in which the same candidate obtained contributions, or absent that, from 
other  same-party election winners of the same district or state. These imputations do not materially affect our results.
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that a given type of candidate wins the election. Because the four categories (liberal 
Democrat, moderate Democrat, moderate Republican, conservative Republican) 
are exhaustive and mutually exclusive, the heights of the four bars sum to 0 within 
each time period, except for small deviations caused by the redistricting adjust-
ments of Section IIIC. Regression details appear in online Appendix Table S10.
Consider first electoral outcomes for conservative Republicans. In all time hori-
zons from  2002–2010 onward, districts subject to greater import competition became 
substantially more likely to elect a GOP conservative. This effect is significant at 
the 10 percent level in  2002–2010 ( t = 1.88 ),  2002–2012 ( t = 1.88 ),  2002–2014 
( t = 1.95 ), and  2002–2016 ( t = 1.72 ) for which the coefficient magnitude falls 
in the narrow range of 29.9 to 26.8. Using results for the 2002 to 2016 period, 
when comparing a  more-versus-less  trade-exposed district, the former would have 
a 13.2  percentage-point ( 26.8 × 0.49 ) higher likelihood of electing a conservative 
Republican.
These improvements in electoral prospects for  GOP conservatives in  trade- 
exposed districts necessarily come at the expense of other candidate types. For 
 2002–2010 onward, the impacts of greater import competition on the election 
probabilities of each of the other three candidate types is negative, though none is 
Figure 6. Exposure to Chinese Import Competition and Ideological Position of Election Winner, 
 2002–2004/2016
Notes: Dependent variables: 100 × change in indicators for election of politician by party and political position. 
Figure reports estimates of equation (5) for the relationship between the change in China import exposure between 
2002 and 2010 and the probability that a candidate of an indicated party and political position is elected (in per-
centage points). The four categories, liberal Democrat, moderate Democrat, moderate Republican, and conserva-
tive Republican, are exhaustive and mutually exclusive. Each bar represents a coefficient from a separate regression 
while whiskers indicate 95 percent confidence intervals. All regressions include the full vector of control variables 
from column 5 of Table 3. Observations are weighted by a  county-district cell’s share in the total  year-2000 voting 
age population of a district, so that each district has a total weight of 1. Standard errors are  two-way clustered on 
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 precisely estimated. The pattern of results indicates that trade shocks do not cause a 
monotone shift toward the political right. Instead, moderate politicians experience 
the largest decline in election probability in each period. In  2002–2010 and later 
periods, the relative losses of moderates within each party coincide with the overall 
shift in favor of the Republican party shown in panel A of Figure 5. Both of these 
developments leave moderate Democrats as the group that accounts for the bulk 
of the losses from conservative GOP gains from 2010 onward. For  2002–2010, the 
 shock-induced decline in election probability for moderate Democrats is 52.3 percent 
( − 15.6/29.9 ) of the gain for GOP conservatives, a fraction that reaches 85.9 per-
cent ( − 23.1/26.8 ) for  2002–2016. Moderate Republicans suffer small declines in 
election probability in each period of the analysis, and thus underperform relative 
to conservatives in their party, while liberal Democrats’ similarly small declines 
outperform the much larger losses suffered by moderate Democrats. These results 
align with the noted demise of moderate congressional legislators in recent decades 
(e.g., Layman et al. 2006).51
To further scrutinize these  non-monotone shifts in electoral success, we again 
split the sample based on whether the majority of  voting-age residents in a county 
were White  non-Hispanics in the year 2000. These estimates are summarized in 
Figure 7, while regression details appear in online Appendix Table S11. Panel A 
of Figure 7 shows that in counties with majority  non-Hispanic White populations, 
trade exposure catalyzed movements toward GOP conservatives in  2002–2010 and 
all later periods. The impacts are marginally significant for  2002–2010,  2002–2012, 
and  2002–2014 ( t-values  t = 1.8 , 1.82, and 1.93, respectively) and slightly less 
precise for  2002–2016 ( t = 1.61 ). Focusing attention on the balance of coun-
ties where less than one-half of the  voting-age population is  non-Hispanic White 
(panel B), we find a largely complementary pattern: liberal Democrats made strong 
gains in these locations in the probability of taking office for  2002–2010 and later 
periods. For the full sample period of  2002–2016, the standardized effect size is a 
21.5  percentage-point ( t = 2.74 ) increase in the probability that a liberal Democrat 
wins office. These gains came largely at the expense of moderate Democrats, whose 
standardized loss in win probability is 21.1 percentage points ( t = 3.25 ).
These results support the reasoning above: in locations with a White  non-Hispanic 
majority voter pool, GOP conservatives who gain at moderates’ expense pull sup-
port across party lines and thereby increase the likelihood of a GOP win; in locations 
with a majority  non-White and Hispanic electorate, liberal Democrats pull support 
from moderates of their own party, meaning that wins by liberal Democrats do not 
increase Democrat win rates overall. The net result is that although more ideolog-
ically extreme members of both parties gain office, it is the GOP that gains seats.
An emerging political economy literature, discussed in the introduction, hypoth-
esizes that economic shocks have the potential to amplify the political salience of 
51 In online Appendix Table S6, we explore the sensitivity of the results in Figure 6 to varying the set of con-
trols included in the regression, while focusing on the time periods 2002 to 2010 and 2002 to 2016. Throughout 
all specification and periods, the import shock reduces the electoral success of moderate Democrats relative to all 
other groups, while conservative Republicans reap much of the offsetting electoral gains. The addition of industry 
and occupation controls and census division dummies increases the magnitude of these effects but lowers their pre-
cision, with some estimates attaining marginal statistical significance for both outcomes. The estimates for liberal 
Democrats and moderate Republicans are smaller in magnitude, unevenly signed, and highly insignificant.
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racial and ethnic identity, yielding divergent responses to trade (or other) shocks 
among race and ethnic groups, even conditional on economic status (Grossman and 
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Figure 7. Exposure to Chinese Import Competition and Ideological Position of Election Winner, 
 2002–2004/2016. Heterogeneity by Initial Local Racial Composition
Notes: Dependent variables: 100 × change in indicators for election of politician by party and political position. 
Figure reports estimates of equation (5), with full controls for initial economic conditions, political conditions, 
and demographic characteristics. Each bar represents a separate regression in which the dependent variable is the 
change in the likelihood that a given type of candidate wins the election. The four categories, liberal Democrat, 
moderate Democrat, moderate Republican, and conservative Republican, are exhaustive and mutually exclusive. 
By definition, one-half of each party’s representatives in 2002 are considered moderates. Whiskers indicate 95 per-
cent confidence intervals. Panel A presents estimates for counties with majority  non-Hispanic White populations in 
2000, while panel B presents estimates for the complementary set. Observations are weighted by a  county-district 
cell’s share in the total  year-2000 voting age population of a district, so that each district has a total weight of 1. 
Standard errors are  two-way clustered on CZs and congressional districts. Regression details appear in online 
Appendix Table S11.
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Helpman 2018; Gennaioli and Tabellini 2019). We read our evidence above as sup-
porting the interpretation that trade shocks have intensified political partisanship: 
raising both voter turnout and  individual-level campaign contributions, and spurring 
majority- and  minority-dominated areas to respond in ideologically opposing direc-
tions, seen both in campaign contributions and votes for  non-centrist candidates.
Before proceeding to results for presidential elections, we briefly consider 
the robustness of the measure of ideological affiliation used in the analysis, the 
Campaign Finance (CF) measure. While this measure is increasingly used in polit-
ical science, it is newer and less commonly applied than the  DW-Nominate score, 
which is based on roll call votes in Congress. In an earlier version of this paper 
examining a shorter time span (Autor et al. 2016), we also employed  DW-Nominate. 
Unfortunately, the  DW-Nominate series which allows each legislator’s ideology to 
evolve according to a linear trend has not been updated beyond 2012, and we were 
not able to consistently recreate and extend these data ourselves.52 We accordingly 
deploy the CF score (Bonica 2013), which is consistently constructed for the time 
period we study. As noted above, CF scores permit us to examine both the ideology 
of donors and the ideology of those elected to office.53
To probe the robustness of the results to the choice of ideology measure, we 
have classified the ideology of elected legislators using  DW-Nominate scores for 
the time period of  2002–2010. In Appendix Table  A2, we show similar impacts 
of import competition on the electoral success of moderate and  non-moderate 
Democrats and Republicans over the  2002–2010 period, whether classified using 
CF or  DW-Nominate scores.54 An additional robustness check indicates that the 
trade shock had a sizable positive but imprecisely measured impact on the electoral 
success of legislators who are connected to the Tea Party movement.55
52 Another version of Nominate scores forces legislator ideology to be constant over the full tenure of a legisla-
tor in Congress, which is arguably less appealing for studying changes in the ideological composition of Congress 
over time.
53 Whereas  contribution-weighted donor CF scores allow legislator ideology to evolve flexibly over time, the 
 DW-Nominate scores we used impose a linear time trend on legislator ideology.
54 In panel A of Appendix Table A2, we define moderate politicians as those whose average campaign donor CF 
score would place them into the more centrist half of their party’s congressional delegation in 2002. In panel B, we 
implement the same split based on  DW-Nominate scores. With either classification, we find that a CZ at the seven-
ty-fifth percentile of import exposure has a substantially increased likelihood of electing a conservative Republican 
compared to a CZ at the twenty-fifth percentile of exposure: a 14.6  percentage-point ( 29.88 × 0.49 ) increase in 
panel A based on DIME and a 17.5  percentage-point ( 35.76 × 0.49 ) increase in panel B based on  DW-Nominate. 
With either classification, a majority of the gains for conservative Republicans come at the expense of moderate 
Democrats, and within either party, moderates perform worse than  non-moderates.
55 We classified legislators as connected to the Tea Party movement if they had a known affiliation at any time 
with one of the following  far-right caucuses of the House: Tea Party Caucus, Liberty Caucus, and Freedom Caucus, 
which respectively formed in the congressional periods that commenced in 2010, 2012, and 2014. While these 
caucuses do not publish official membership lists, Wikipedia compiles lists of individuals who  self-identified or 
were identified by others as members. We pooled these lists from the Wikipedia entries of May 2011, 2013, 2015, 
and 2017, which we accessed via the Wayback Machine Internet Archive. According to this definition, there were 
77 Tea Party Republicans in the 2010 Congress, nearly three-quarters of which were conservative Republicans 
according to the CF score measure. According to untabulated regression results for the  2002–2010 period, the stan-
dardized effect size of the import shock is a 9.0  percentage-point ( t = 1.50 ) increase in the likelihood of electing 
a Tea Party Republican.
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V. Impact of Trade Shocks on Presidential Elections
Because each congressional district chooses among a disparate set of candidates, 
votes cast for a candidate from the same political party in different districts are not 
necessarily votes cast in favor of a legislator with the same ideological position 
relative to local alternatives. Presidential elections by contrast provide a setting in 
which all localities simultaneously choose among the same set of candidates. This 
fact motivates our examination of the effect of trade exposure on presidential vote 
outcomes. A side benefit of examining voting in presidential contests is that the 
 time-varying geographic structure of congressional districts does not apply to pres-
idential elections. Hence, we can analyze  county-level changes of party vote shares 
in presidential elections for a longer time period without confronting the vagaries 
of  redistricting.
In Table 5, we estimate the impact of trade exposure on the change in the 
 county-level GOP vote share between the 2000 and 2008 and the 2000 and 2016 
presidential elections. These highly competitive elections bracket the time period of 
our analysis of congressional elections. The three years considered, 2000, 2008, and 
2016, correspond to elections in which a  two-term incumbent (Bill Clinton, George 
W. Bush, Barack Obama, respectively) was stepping down from office, and thus 
represent common positions in the political cycle.56 Our measure of trade exposure 
is that used in equation (5), now defined over the period 2000 to 2008, while the 
instrumentation strategy continues to follow that in Section IIA.57
The 2SLS estimates reported in panel A of Table 5 find a positive and mar-
ginally statistically significant impact ( t = 1.87 ) of rising Chinese import com-
petition on the share of votes going to the GOP presidential candidate between 
2000 and 2008. The point estimate for the column 6 regression, which includes 
full controls, implies that the Republican  two-party vote share rose by nearly a 
full percentage point for an interquartile range increase in import penetration 
( 1.59 × 0.58 = 0.91 ). Panel B indicates that the  trade-induced shift in party vote 
share persisted after 2008. Counties that had been more exposed to import com-
petition during the Chinese import boom continued to favor the Republican candi-
date in the 2016 election, where the impact with full controls in column 6 is larger 
in magnitude (1.71) and slightly more precisely estimated ( t = 1.90 ) than for the 
 2000–2008 period.58 These results on presidential elections appear to corroborate 
56 Because voting patterns in incumbency elections tend to be skewed toward the party of the sitting presi-
dent, they are not closely comparable to elections where the president is ineligible (or not running) for reelection. 
Historically, the party holding the presidency has won two out of every three elections when the incumbent pres-
ident was running, but only one-half of the elections when the incumbent was stepping down (Mayhew 2008).
57 The sequentially added control variables follow the specification used for congressional elections, except that 
we lag controls for electoral outcomes in presidential elections by an additional four years to avoid a mechanical 
correlation with the outcome variables.
58 In a related research note (Autor et al. 2017), we also find a significant positive impact on the change in GOP 
presidential county vote shares over 2000 to 2016 for a  CZ-level trade shock that extends from 2000 to 2014, the 
last year for which we have trade data (where most of the increase in Chinese import penetration occurred by 2008). 
We calculate that a 50.0 percent ceteris paribus reduction in the China trade shock between  2000–2014 would have 
tipped the narrow Republican voter majority in the states of Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Michigan, leading to an 
Electoral College victory for Hillary Clinton, instead of a victory for Donald Trump. This notional exercise high-
lights the relevance of a  trade-induced shift in party vote shares in presidential elections, which are more closely 
contested than most congressional elections. It however corresponds to a restrictive scenario where local exposure 
to the China shock affects the 2016 US presidential general election exclusively through its effect on the local 
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our finding from congressional elections that greater trade exposure induces a net 
shift in favor of candidates on the right.59
VI. Concluding Remarks
The polarization of national politics has been one of the defining developments 
of American discourse of the last several decades. The coincidence of intensifying 
political partisanship and rising income inequality has led many to conjecture that 
economic changes are at least partly responsible for greater political divisiveness. 
Indeed, political actors have frequently suggested a connection between changes in 
the US economy and the growing ideological divide in Congress. In the 2016 US 
presidential campaign, candidates from both parties singled out China’s rise as an 
Republican  two-party vote share. Our results above show that the China shock altered the ideological composition 
of the House prior to 2016, and those representatives’ political activities may have subsequently contributed to the 
2016 election outcome.
59 In related work, Che et al. (2016) reports that increases in  county-level trade exposure stemming from the US 
grant of Permanent Normal Trading Relations (PNTR) to China in 2000 seems to disadvantage Republican presi-
dential candidates, which is opposite in spirit to our results above. Despite similarities, we do not believe this finding 
directly bears on our results. Che et al. pool data on each presidential election between 1992 to 2008 and thus study 
an earlier time window than ours, while combining both elections with and without an incumbent president who 
was seeking reelection. Since their paper is focused on Congressional rather than presidential elections, it reports 
only a single regression estimate for the latter. Because this estimate derives from a very demanding regression 
specification that controls for multiple measures of import exposure and covariates interacted with a  post-PNTR 
indicator, it is challenging to interpret and evaluate its relationship to our results without further elaboration.
Table 5—Exposure to Chinese Import Competition and Presidential Election Vote Shares, 2000–2008 
and 2000–2016, 2SLS Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A. ΔNet Republican vote share, 2000–2008
ΔCZ import penetration, 2000–2008 1.54 5.60 2.38 1.75 1.59
(0.73) (1.41) (1.24) (0.86) (0.85)
Panel B. ΔNet Republican vote share, 2000–2016
ΔCZ import penetration, 2000–2008 3.86 3.98 1.72 1.99 1.71
(1.48) (1.69) (1.71) (0.97) (0.90)
Estimation method 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
F-statistic first stage 63.7 50.2 46.4 48.1 48.0
2000 ind/occ controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Census division dummies Yes Yes Yes
2000 demography controls Yes Yes
1992/1996 election controls Yes
Notes: Dependent variable: change in percentage of two-party vote obtained by Republican candidate, 2008 
(McCain) or 2016 (Trump) versus 2000 (Bush). Observations = 3,107 counties, excluding Alaska and Hawaii. 
The mean change in net Republican vote share is −3.50 (standard deviation 5.69) between 2000 and 2008 and is 
−0.74 (standard deviation 9.95) between 2000 and 2016. All regressions are estimated by 2SLS. Observations are 
weighted by counties’ total votes in the 2000 presidential election, and standard errors are clustered by CZ. Industry 
and occupation controls in column 2 are measured at the CZ level and comprise the fraction of CZ employment in 
the manufacturing sector and the Autor and Dorn (2013) routine share and offshorability index of a CZ’s occupa-
tions. Census division dummies in column 3 allow for different time trends across the nine geographical Census 
divisions. Demographic controls in column 5 comprise the percentage of a county’s population in nine age and 
four racial groups, as well as the population shares that are female, college-educated, foreign-born, and Hispanic. 
Election controls in column 5 comprise the Republican two-party vote share in the presidential elections of 1992 
and 1996, measured at the county level.
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international competitor as a principal cause of US economic malaise. Yet, there is a 
paucity of previous evidence that substantiates a causal impact of specific economic 
shocks on political polarization.
Our contribution in this paper is to document that this vitriolic campaign rhetoric 
is indicative of underlying economic pressures that find voice in electoral contests. 
Across a broad range of outcomes, growing import competition from China has 
contributed either to a shift to the political right, or to a polarization where both 
liberal and conservative forces gain relative to moderates. These patterns manifest 
in a rightward shift of the  media-viewing habits of US adults, greater polarization 
in the ideological orientation of campaign contributors, and net gains in the number 
of conservative GOP representatives, which come largely at the cost of moderate 
Democrats. During the two most recent  non-incumbent presidential elections, 2008 
and 2016, trade shocks also appeared to modestly increase the vote share of the 
Republican candidate.
For all of the outcomes that we study, rightward shifts in ideological affili-
ation and voting patterns are concentrated among or driven by  non-Hispanic 
Whites, with small, zero, or countervailing effects evident among Hispanics and 
 non-Whites. But the consequences for electoral outcomes are nuanced. In dis-
tricts dominated by Whites, the political beneficiaries of these economic forces 
are Republicans, particularly from the far right, whereas  minority-dominated dis-
tricts experience shifts to the left end of the spectrum. In both  majority-White 
and  majority-minority locations, however, these polarizing ideological shifts 
come primarily at the electoral expense of moderate Democrats, meaning that the 
net gain in seats accrues primarily to the Republican Party. The paradox of con-
verging popular beliefs about the source of economic challenges accompanied by 
diverging beliefs about appropriate political responses is consistent with theoreti-
cal models that connect economic adversity to  in-group/ out-group identification, 
as motivated in part by  group-based resource competition or opportunistic use of 
political extremism by political entrepreneurs.
What may distinguish trade in terms of its impact on political outcomes is that its 
disruptive effects are so concentrated demographically and geographically. The loss 
of manufacturing jobs has represented a major contraction in  high-wage earning 
opportunities, especially for  less-educated males (Autor, Dorn, and Hanson 2019). 
Further, whereas exposure to technological change in the labor market has affected 
both wealthy cities populated by  white-collar professionals and factory towns pop-
ulated by  blue-collar workers, rising import penetration from  low-wage countries 
disproportionately bears on local labor markets that historically specialized in 
 labor-intensive manufacturing (Autor, Dorn, and Hanson 2013b). The combination 
of these features enhances the salience of the  labor-market impacts of trade and 
therefore their political resonance (Margalit 2011). While it would be unwarranted 
based on this evidence to conclude that the China trade shock is the original or 
fundamental cause of three decades of growing US political polarization, our anal-
ysis of the China trade shock highlights a nuance masked by aggregate trends: the 
connection between economic and political polarization may arise not entirely from 
overarching secular changes in the US economy that affect skill demands nationally, 
but also from shocks whose disruptive force falls heavily on an identifiable set of 
voters who in turn respond with concentrated vehemence at the polls.
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Appendix. Figures and Tables
Figure A1. Exposure to Chinese Import Competition and Campaign Contributions,  2002–2004/2016
Notes: Dependent variables: proportional change in contributions by ideology type (in log points). Figure reports 
estimates of equation (5) for the relationship between changes in China import exposure between 2002 and 2010 
and 100 × proportional changes in campaign contributions within ideology terciles (based on 2002 contribu-
tions, as per Figure 2) across designated year pairs. Proportional changes are defined according to equation (6) 
and approximate a log change. Each bar represents a coefficient from a separate regression while whiskers indi-
cate 95 percent confidence intervals. All regressions include the full vector of control variables from column 5 of 
Table 3. Observations are weighted by a  county-district cell’s share in the total  year-2000 voting age population of 
a district, so that each district has a total weight of 1. Standard errors are  two-way clustered on CZs and congressio-
nal districts. Full regression results are reported in online Appendix Table S12.
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